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This paper examines the plans for modernisation of the Russian economy in the light of the
challenges posed by both the global crisis to Russia in 2008–09 and the possible resur-
facing of the crisis in 2012–13. Both developments help to understand the weaknesses of
a process of change that after twenty years seems still to be incapable of supporting
a sustainable and competitive market economy. Will liberal forces make their way through
to ﬁnally challenge the obstacle to competition with accession to WTO? This paper
addresses this question taking into account the possible impact of the reform-minded
components of the new government formed in May 2012, but also that of forces hostile
to change. The third mandate (2012–2018) of President Putin and his personal approach
focused on the accelerated developments of some branches and far eastern regions send
contrasting signals with regard to the balance between state and market policies in the
pursuit of medium to long term goals. Whether new programmes are feasible under
increasing competition from abroad after the 2012 entry into WTO and the controversial
corporatist political system are also questions discussed by this paper.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Russia’s transition to market has been painful and, in
many aspects, is still incomplete. After the demise of the
planned economy, the Russian model of growth has been
questioned more than once. The two ﬁnancial and
economic crises that hit Russia – in 1998 and 2008 – did so
at just the point when the country appeared to be ﬁnally
entering onto a sustainable path of growth, suggesting thatarch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Haan assessment of the viability of the current Russian growth
model remains problematic. After almost a decade of robust
growth from 1999 – marked by the gradual deployment of
market institutions, but primarily by increasing oil prices –
growth came to a halt in 2008 reversing under the effects of
the international crisis and leading to a tremendous output
fall in 2009. To date Russia is still struggling to recover from
this crisis. Policy makers are simultaneously trying to
understand the reasons for a comparatively poor perfor-
mance during the crisis, whilst striving to lay down more
solid foundations for sustainable growth as well as looking
to prepare for possible onset of a new crisis.
This paper examines the plans for modernisation of
the economy from above and followed-up criticism from
below in the light of the challenges posed by the global
crisis to Russia in 2008–09. It also discusses the challenges
of the possible resurfacing of the crisis in 2012. Both
developments – linked to international price and demandnyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1 http://www.vedomosti.ru/ﬁnance/news/2009/10/06/853393 (acce-
ssed on 6 October 2009) and even up to 75% if state indirect control is
included, see A. Shokhin in http://www.rbcdaily.ru/print.shtml?2009/
12/15/focus/447977 (accessed on 15 December 2009).
2 See I.O. Sukhareva, “Upravelnie problemnymi dolgami v bank-
ovskom sektore: uroki krizisa” on 17.08.2011 from http://www.forecast.
ru/mainframe.asp?ADDR_FROM¼http://www.forecast.ru/news.asp.
while on the basis of Russian evaluation standards, according to
Sukhareva, bad loans were still high at 8.2% of total credit on 1 April 2011
Though, apparently, the banking sector started recovering in 2010, using
international standards S&Ps in May 2010 estimated non -performing
loans (NPLs) at c.40% of total credit, see http://top.rbc.ru/economics/19/
05/2010/408807.shtml?print accessed on 19 May 2010.
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a process of change that after twenty years seems still to be
incapable of supporting a sustainable and competitive
market economy. Will liberal forces make their way
through to ﬁnally challenge the obstacle to competition
demanded by accession to WTO? This paper addresses this
question taking into account the possible impact of the
reform-minded components of the new government
formed in May 2012, but also that of forces hostile to
change. The third mandate (2012–2018) of President Putin
(Putin III) and new economic policy guidelines focused on
the accelerated developments of some branches and
regions send contrasting signals with regard to the balance
between state and market policies in the pursuit of
medium to long term goals. Whether such programmes are
primarily conceived to strengthen national security as such,
or help the economy withstand growing foreign competi-
tion is unclear.
Over almost a decade Russian economic growth has
been heavily dependent on natural resources and energy,
sectors by and large under direct or indirect government
control. Under the crisis the role of the state in the economy
has increased and become too costly to public ﬁnances
exposing the failures of the Russian model of growth. A
debate on theworst aspects of Russian development stirred
by President Medvedev himself with his manifesto “Russia,
forward” in September 2009, laid the ground for a number
of reforms that should have helped diversify the Russian
economy away from natural resources thanks to drivers of
innovation established by the government. An earlier
concept to 2020 was thoroughly revised by a team of highly
qualiﬁed experts to help accommodate these goals. New
guidelines for reform also targeted at private businesses
emerged and some signiﬁcant reforms were approved.
However by mid-2012 and the end of Medvedev’s mandate
a number of structural reforms had still to be implemented
and results looked mixed. That diversiﬁcation away from
fuel and energy had to be pursued, but on a longer –
possibly 2030 – horizon, found common grounds among
government and experts. This raises the issue of new versus
former goals that this paper tried to single out.
A change in strategies and priorities with the switching
of mandates between Putin and Medvedev (the Premier
selected by Putin III) is emerging though there are elements
of continuity, the importance of which is difﬁcult to assess
a priori. The pursuit of strategic goals is constrained by the
need to restore macroeconomic balances, while the
economy remains exposed to a new cycle of international
price shocks and likely economic slowdown in 2012–13. In
this context, the new government chaired by Medvedev
from May 2012 could be forced to relax its grasp on the
economy and ﬁnally implement a new wave of privatisa-
tion. A broad programme of privatisation has, indeed, been
announced by the government, but important issues, such
as the fate of the fuel/energy complex, are still to be
deﬁned. More importantly the role of who is who in the
current political arrangements is still unclear. It is also
uncertain whether the balance of forces – the current
power elite versus either established opposition parties or
new movements that have become restless after the 2011
Duma elections and Putin’s return to Presidency – willallow for a smooth evolution. The majority party, Edinaia
Rossiia, earlier referred to as the single party in power, is
also internally divided.
This paper focuses on a new approach to economic
development and growth that is still unfolding, where the
scope for private entrepreneurship appears to be broad-
ening though still subject to “loyalty” to power. That loyalty
is becoming costly. The most challenging national goals –
from the development of Siberia and the Far East regions to
the creation of a Single Economic Space to be expanded
into an Eurasian Economic Space –could subtract resources
to modernisation of Western regions and branches whose
ﬁrms are more exposed to foreign competition. For the ﬁrst
time after the troubles of the nineties, the divide between
contrasting priorities and disoriented constituencies has
become sharper and may lead to unforeseen political
developments where foreign policy concerns are also likely
to play a major role. As a consequence, the construct of the
existing political arrangement may need to change. The
paper concludes with a discussion of the ﬁssures in the
structure of power that, under the current constraints to
growth, can seriously erode its legitimacy.
Constraints on growth
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–09 exposed the main
weaknesses inherent to the Russian economic model–
excessive dependence on prices of energy/fuel, commodity
exports and world economic growth – compared to other
emerging economiesmore resilient to international shocks.
Public and private investment fell tremendously under
tighter ﬁnancial constraints. Despite huge government’s
subsidies and state guarantees to large-scale enterprises,
and in particular to state companies, GDP and industrial
output fell by 7.8% and 10.8% respectively in 2009 – the
worst outcome within the BRICs group of large emerging
market economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China and
within the G20). Selective rescue operations in favour of
system-forming companies and banks pushed the share of
the state in the national economy up by 15% to reach 50% of
the total output.1 The ﬁnancial sector was also badly hit.
Bad loans increased from September 2008 to December
2009 by 7.2% up to about 10% of total loans according to
Russian evaluation standards.2 The collapse of the economy
occurred unexpectedly after almost a decade of robust
growth (an annual average of c.7% of GDPwhen growth and
rising living standards were fuelled by increasing oil and
commodity prices and exports due to favourable
6 See M. Dmitriev in http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/096/10.
html?print¼201101091247 on 30 August 2011. Late 2011 (13 September
2011) Kudrin cautioned that even an oil price of $116 pb in 2012 would be
barely sufﬁcient for a balanced budget, seehttp://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/
m.191382.html.
7 See http://www.vedomosti.ru/ﬁnance/news/1827736/prizraki_2008_
goda?from¼newsletter-editor-choice accessed on 7 June 2012.
8 For 2011, versus the (usually) more optimistic 76US$ hoped for by
the Ministry of Economic Development (Minecon), the MOF earlier pro-
jected a scissor of $50 to $70 pb, see http://www1.minﬁn.ru/ru/press/
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inﬂows in 2006–07 that helped a credit boom.
Under the effects of the crisis, the public debate on
economic diversiﬁcation – a policy that should help
emancipate Russian growth from oil/gas dependence –
intensiﬁed. The oligopolistic structure of the economy
feeding rent-seeking behaviour among investors and
hampering the development of competitive markets was
increasingly questioned. Public blame started turning
against inefﬁcient state entities. Decisions on the structure
and management of large state companies, innovation
schemes and several privatisation plans, as discussed
below, were approved by the authorities in a hurry to speed
up changes.
But the dilemma of whether economic diversiﬁcation
should be left to private entrepreneurs in amore favourable
business environment pursued by government reforms or
steered from above remained, and still is, unresolved with
no clear sign of which option may prevail. On the one hand,
the room for state support, either in the form of direct
investment, state guarantees and/or state procurement, has
shrunk in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Both central
and regional budgets suffered from the crisis. On the other
hand, the ﬁnancial sector, as whole, is slow to recover.
The situation to date may still be worrying despite
a short spell of world-wide economic recovery. The Russian
economy started growing again in 2010 with growth
picking up in 2011 mainly due to positive developments in
the world economy and price upturns. Financial balances
need still to be restored. The number of loss-making banks
increased from 90 to 127 in six months from the beginning
of 2011.3 Despite tightening regulations and supervision
that produced some good effects in 2010–2011, problem
loans increased twice as much as reserves in the ﬁrst
months of 2012 hitting proﬁts. The estimated share of bad
loans started increasing again.4 These data point to
a possible new round of credit tightening, while many large
companies that had managed to restructure their pre-crisis
foreign loans are approaching their new debt maturity.
There are signs, in mid-2012, that large companies are
again approaching the government for state support in
terms of guarantees for their debt.5 Market-orientated
reforms, such as divestment of state ownership and
incentives to private investment, even if rapidly approved
and implemented, would need time to take hold.
As is usually the case for Russia, effective economic
growth and budget performance aremore dependent on oil
prices than on other factors. Estimates about which level of3 See http://www.banki.ru/news/bankpress/?id¼3184702 accessed on
30 August 2011.
4 See http://www.vedomosti.ru/ﬁnance/news/1788141/gonka_plohih_
kreditov?from¼newsletter-editor-choice accessed on 28 May 2012.
5 Financial problems (discussed in relation to a large pipe-producing
metallurgical company in Cheliabinsk that asked for state support) – are
common in the branch inducing the new Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment Belousov to consider extending state guarantees already used
in 2009 to troubled companies that otherwise would not have access to
bank loans, see http://www.vedomosti.ru/ﬁnance/news/1817528/nuzhny_
garantii?from¼newsletter-editor-choice accessed on 5 June 2012 and
http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1853258/bremya_gosudarstva
accessed on 15 June 2012.oil prices will be sufﬁcient to balance the budget are
recurrent and a subject of dispute between ministries and
among outside experts and politicians. Fiscal balances are
projected as rule in two versions: one is based on actual
revenues and expenditures. The second is simulated in the
absence of oil-related revenues. The tighter – although not
necessarily the most reliable – are, obviously, the estimates
by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). In August 2011, Mikhail
Dmitriev, the head of the government Centre for Strategic
Reforms, estimated that a fall of $10 in the price of oil
would cause a fall of budget revenues equal to one
percentage point of GDP.6 Oil prices later increased helping
most, but not all, worries to subside. Fiscal authorities
remain vigilant. Recent Ministry of Finance (MOF) esti-
mates reckon that a $1 fall of the price of oil causes Rouble
56bn loss to the budget (c.$1.5bn), while one percentage
point fall in GDP would cause revenues to fall by 150bn
Roubles (c.$5bn).7In the light of persistent economic
uncertainties, the MOF continues to project –within the
three year budget forecasting adopted by Russia – different
levels of budget deﬁcit according to a possible range of oil
prices.8Due in part to the volatile world economic recovery
in 2011 and in part to international turmoil in oil producing
countries, higher oil prices provided for a 4.3% GDP growth
and balanced budget in 2011.9While a better than expected
outcome should be a relief to the MOF, concerns remain
since economic recovery becomes a pretext for higher
spending pressures from both government bodies and
politicians.
The guardian of stability is the MOF as a whole, but the
personality in charge also matters. Alexei Kudrin was
known for his determination to keep ﬁscal balances under
control. His removal may be not without consequences.
Before his forced dismissal from the post of Minister of
Finance on September 2011 after strong disagreements
with Medvedev on planned expenditures and budget
projections – Kudrin had predicted that in 2012 eventranscripts/index.php?id4¼9676 accessed on May 14, 2010. However,
given the scale of social spending incurred in 2009 and 2010 and
pensions’ rise approved by the government – despite a perverse combi-
nation of rapidly ageing population and excessively low retirement age –
with falling oil prices there was a concern that even $80 pb could jeop-
ardise macroeconomic stability. These projections were later changed.
9 Indeed, even a small estimated surplus of 0.8% of GDP and a primary
surplus of 1.3% of GDP, but with an estimated budget deﬁcit of 9.6% of
GDP if oil prices are excluded, see Evsei Gurvich’s estimates in http://
www.eeg.ru/pages/22 accessed on 5 June 2012, the World Bank Global
Economic Prospects accessed on 15 June 2012 from http://web.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/
EXTGBLPROSPECTSAPRIL/0,,menu PK:659178wpagePK:64218926wpiPK:
64218953wtheSitePK:659149,00.htmland and MDE’s report on 2011 in
http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/macro/monitoring/
doc20120202_05 accessed on 2 February 2012.
14 See http://www.vedomosti.ru/ﬁnance/news/1353016/dorozhe_armii
and http://www.europarussia.com/posts/2326 both accessed on 2
September 2011 on an estimated military expenditure of $650bn over
2011-2020. The round ﬁgure published by this source is not correct
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warning that a new crisis was looming ahead and oil prices
would, indeed, turn down.10 That warning should have
prompted the government to adopt lower oil reference
prices in its budget projections in the effort to build large
cautionary reserves – the policy that had helped Russia’s
public balances towithstand the effects of the crisis in 2009
without having to increase public debt – contrary to most
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment) countries.
But Kudrin’s departure may cause more relaxation on
spending. While Kudrin in the past succeeded with no
much effort to have his budget projections approved by the
Duma, the newMOF – Anton Siluanov – needs still to prove
to be as tenacious. As a matter of fact, in the ﬁrst reading
(May 16 2012) the Duma had managed to amend and raise
by $5, to $105 pb, the oil price reference projection for the
2012 budget (“Budget for 2012 and for the planning period
2013 and 2014”) submitted by the MOF. This could have
entailed, according to the MOF, an estimated loss of 300bn
roubles (about $10bn) to the Reserve Fund – where reve-
nues earmarked above a certain oil (projected) price
threshold are stored for precaution.11 In the end, the budget
projection – from the $100 pb estimate by the MOF – was
even increased to $115, an unrealistic projection according
to MOF Siluanov who, however, subsequently pledged that
any further correction would not affect planned spending,
therefore foreseeing the development of a budget deﬁcit.12
Apart from departmental skirmishes and squabbles that
are common in any country, however, increased spending
in Russia as projected for the decade to 2020 may come
under pressure from a more moderate pace of economic
growth for the years to come, certainly compared to the
early 2000s. A tentative 4.0–4.5% annual average rate of
growth (some three percentage points less than the annual
average from 2000 to 2007) has been projected, indeed, in
a scenario” to 2030 drafted in April 2012 by the MED
(Ministry of Economic Development), possibly extrapo-
lating from optimistic short term forecast by the IMF and
the OECD.13 Despite looking comparatively enviable by
most OECD countries, this growth rate may still be insuf-
ﬁcient for the ambitious agenda of structural changes
envisaged over 2011–2020 and beyond. Such costly10 See Kudrin (on 13 September 2011) in http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/
m.191382.html.
11 See http://ria.ru/economy/20120516/650565774.html?id¼ and http://
www.1prime.ru/news/0/%7BEA0339D8-0ECC-443C-8A4F-56C2BE3F47D2%
7D.uif?print¼1 both accessed on 16May 2012. It is worth noting that at the
time of this writing the oil prices have already fallen to below $100 while
a major international slow-down is looming ahead. In the context of
economic uncertainty (June 2012) the IMF suggested the authorities to
lower the reference oil price for the 2013 budget to $92pb;much lower than
projections by the MOF and the MED preliminary set at $97 pb and
$100 pb respectively, see http://www.1prime.ru/news/0/%7B1AA7B563-
A9F8-47AB-B398-8CE12BF4E195%7D.uif?print¼1.
12 Seehttp://www.rosbalt.ru/business/2012/05/28/985719.html accessed
on 28 May 2012 and http://ria.ru/economy/20120622/679182855.html
accessed on 22 June 2012.
13 See The World economic Outlook, IMF 2012, p.68 in and the
government’s innovation scenario projections in http://government.ru/
docs/18778/ accessed on 26 April 2012. The 2012 Spring Economic
Outlook by the OECD projects a 4.5% GDP growth.modernisation plans range from technical re-equipping of
the armed forces estimated to cost some 20 trillion roubles
(c.$666bn) to innovation as such that over the same period
would need some 16 trillion roubles (c.$533bn) according
to the Ministry of Economic Development.14 State railways
programmes need investments up to 400bn roubles (some
$13.5bn) to ﬁnance the upgrading of the network over
2011–2015.15 Such plans are already becoming problem-
atic. The MOF soon after Presidential elections has made
clear that spending cuts must be envisaged to start soon for
plans to 2020, including cuts to priorities such as defence
expenditures that may have to fall by some 4 trillion
roubles out of a total cut in spending equal to 7 trillion
roubles.16
Increased spending could be in principle ﬁnanced by
debt emission. However, despite the Russian govern-
ment’s comparatively easier access to foreign lending
(justiﬁed largely by Russia’s good track record in hon-
ouring foreign debt) envisaged in the 2010–2012 budgets
on debt emission, ﬁnancing strategic goals has become
dubious in the light of world recession already looming by
the third quarter of 2011.17 A Sberbank study published in
May 2012 warns that, if the European economy collapses
due to the disordered fall-out of the Greek crisis, Russian
GDP could fall by 2.1 percentage points and inﬂation
increase to 6.7% (compared to earlier MED’s projections of
3.8% and 4.5–5.0%) with oil prices falling possibly to $80–
85.18 If this scenario materialises and Russia is hit again
severely by the waves of a new crisis, is difﬁcult to see
how earlier plans together with new projects aiming at an
accelerated development of the eastern regions (as
described below) could be ﬁnanced out of the state
budget. All in all the ﬁnancial constraints to growth have
become tighter raising the rather common dilemma of
how to reduce spending while at the same time making it
more efﬁcient.though widely quoted: it should refer only to the armaments programme,
not all military spending over the period (courtesy comment from J.M.
Cooper). Note that the text bases, as a rule of thumb given the highly
volatile rates, dollar estimates on a virtual exchange rate of $30 per rouble.
15 See http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/1355059/milliardy_
dlya_yakunina on 2 September 2011. Putin later estimated that 5 tril-
lion roubles would be needed to modernise Russian railways, see http://
www.vz.ru/news/2012/4/26/576299.html, accessed on 26 April 2012.
16 See details of planned spending cuts year by year to 2020 in http://
www.ng.ru/printed/269144.
17 See Malle S., “The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Russia”, Nato
Defence College Forum paper, Research Division, Rome, December 2009,
pp.11–12 on easy access of Russia to the international market and http://
www.vestiﬁnance.ru/articles/11662 accessed on 18 May 2012, on MOF
refusing to increase foreign debt on account of the worsening economic
environment.
18 See the summary of the study led by Ksenya Yudaeva of the Centre of
Macroeconomic Research of the Sberbank inhttp://www.vedomosti.ru/
ﬁnance/news/1779385/evrogrecheskij_udar?from¼newsletter-editor-choice
andhttp://www.orelbanks.ru/shownews.php?id¼72833both accessedon24
May 2012. See also M. Dmitriev’s belief on an incumbent new crisis in http://
www.svpressa.ru/society/article/55967/ accessed on 8 June 2012.
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Uncertainties and worries about future economic
developments of the world economy and their impact on
Russia jeopardise conﬁdence in the blueprints for economic
development worked out earlier in a time of rapid growth.
Earlier plans will need to be made consistent with tighter
ﬁscal policies that may limit scope and scale of state
support. Until now, post-2009 crisis government policy
was driven by expediency on the one side, and oppor-
tunism, on the other. Therewas no ﬁrm direction of change.
New constraints at present could either force a re-thinking
of priorities or prompt the undertaking of liberal reforms. If
the authorities keep muddling through, the two paths
could tentatively proceed in parallel, but such policies
would not send a clear message to would-be domestic and
foreign investors.
Grand projects for a post-soviet Free Trade Area to
develop into an Eurasian Economic Union19 as well as plans
to develop the backward regions bordering the increasingly
invasive power of China announced by Putin III in the
aftermath of his election (as discussed below), combine
with government changes in 2012, a weakened premier-
ship and the cooling down of relations with inﬂuential
OECD countries. This is unlikely to stimulate the approval
and implementation of a liberal agenda. The social envi-
ronment is also altogether hostile or suspicious. While
a few circles call for privatisation to increase efﬁciency and
complete the 90s market reforms, the vast majority of the
population, as well as top public ofﬁcials in charge of large
state companies, are in favour of keeping state control of
the economy.20 Putin’s economic programmes published
before the start of his Third Presidential mandate and
immediately after while not explicitly ruling out more
radical reforms,21 retain, nonetheless, the emphasis on
priority for development in selected areas where the main
concern remains that the state should not lose control. It is
difﬁcult to assess how mutually compatible different poli-
cies, one orientated to market reforms, the other to accel-
erated (or forced) economic progress, can be and which
priorities will be pursued de facto given tightened budget
constraints.
For example, Putin III’s long-term policies on innovation
and modernisation (as (published in his May 7, 2012 ukaz)
focus, on the one hand, on the need for technological
forecasting22 for the manufacturing sector of the economy,
and on programmes to increase the competitiveness of19 Cfr. J.M. Cooper’s presentation “Prospects for the Eurasian Economic
Union” – kindly made available – that examines developments form on
the tri-partite Customs Union (Russia Belarus and Kazakhstan), the Single
Economic Space up to the Eurasian Economic Union planned to be formed
in the near future, at Saint Antony’s College, Oxford, 21 May 2012.
20 See the results of an opinion poll in www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/
article/2009/11/10/218439 accessed on 10 November 2009.
21 A summary of 11 decrees (ukazy) approved by Putin on 7 May 2012-
the ﬁrst day of his Third Presidential mandate can be found in http://
www.vz.ru/politics/2012/5/8/577872.print.html. The ukazy are pub-
lished in the Presidential website.
22 The importance of strategic forecasting for economic development
had already been evoked by Putin earlier, see http://premier.gov.ru/
events/news/18791/print/ accessed on 26 April 2012.industry, on the other. These policies are hardly consistent.
Why technological forecasting would be needed in an
increasingly open economy that would easily send the right
signals and, if the case, provide for supply is unclear.
Indeed, a concern for self-sufﬁciency – or perhaps security
in some ﬁeld – looms through the lines and is strident with
the requirements for membership into the WTO (World
Trade Organisation). In this context, the fact that WTO
membership and its economic effects are not even
mentioned in Putin’s ukaz sounds singular.
A (selective) branch approach to innovation – with
aviation industry, space activities, pharmaceutical and
medical equipment industry, shipbuilding, electronics
speciﬁcally listed among Putin III’s state programmes –
remains prominent as formerly under President Medve-
dev’s innovation plans. The socio-economic development
of Siberia and the Far East emerges as a priority in planning
transport infrastructure, but it is unlikely that it could
remain limited to that area given the very nature of
transport logistics in a large country.23 Costs could grow
beyond control: a targeted plan for the socio-economic
development of the Far East and the Baikal region to 2013
with an estimated total cost of 954.3bn roubles (c.$32bn)
was already in place earlier. Unsurprisingly, costing esti-
mates and the starting of the new plan to 2025 have been
postponed by the MOF to 2013.24
Accelerated development in some branches and regions
provides the context for the working out of possible
development scenarios to 2030 assigned to the MED in
early 2012. TheMED came out with two scenarios to 2030 –
one innovative and the second conservative. Interestingly,
the scenarios had to be redrafted after circulation of an
earlier version under pressure to show that growth would
be higher than initially forecast thanks to boosts in invest-
ment, with a ratio of investment to GDP in the innovation
(more liberal) higher than in the conservative (less market-
orientated) scenario up to 29.5 and 27.3 of GDP by 2030
respectively. More revealing, perhaps, circa a slower pace of
economic diversiﬁcation than earlier hoped for in particular
by the MED, investment projections to 2020 have been
corrected upward, with investment to GDP up to 24% of
GDP from 22.2% in the former version stemming from
higher investment in fuel/energy complex from 5.9% GDP to
6.5% GDP .25 Interestingly in both scenarios the rate of
investment to GDP is much higher than projected for 2020
with both private and public investment contributing,
though with different weight in each scenario. It is unclear
whether the effects of the possible privatisation of oil23 See http://www.kremlin.ru/news/15232 for the ukaz on long-term
economic policy (accessed on May 7 2012). See also Putin on the need
to support aviation and ship building that otherwise could not make
them on their own, see http://er.ru/news/2012/2/7/putin-aviastroenie-i-
sudostroenie-ne-mogut-razvivatsya-bez-gospodderzhki/ accessed on 7
February 2012.
24 See http://www.1prime.ru/news/0/%7B077E8149-FD6D-420A-BB55-
01B7A5C423E2%7D.uif also for interdepartmental conﬂicts on cost esti-
mates, and http://www.newsru.com/ﬁnance/13jun2012/gosprogrammy.
html listing some 36 plans to be ﬁxed in 2012 that do not include
development of the Far East.
25 See http://ria.ru/economy/20120607/668033868.html accessed on 7
June 2012.
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Putin III making clear that such companies are still
considered strategic appointed the former First Deputy
Minister for Energy, Igor Sechin, a notorious opponent of
privatisation as the Head of Rosneft.
Nonetheless, despite the continued emphasis on
government-led plans, changes in Russian government’s
policy regarding privatisation and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) discussed below in separate sections, suggest
that a more liberal approach to reforms at least in certain
areas may ﬁnd its way through stubborn state-orientated
mind-sets.28 See http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1353993/zakupka_
nevypolnima on 1 September 2011 and http://www.ng.ru/printed/
258889 on 2 September 2009 where Nabiullina, the Minister of
Economic Development, announces tentatively the approval of new state
procurement provisions by end-2011/beginning 2012 warning that at any
rate they will need at least three years to be put in force.
29 See a positive assessment – albeit with caveats on little market
competition, from a successful young Russian businessman operating
mainly in the tertiary sector, in “HowMuch is Russia Changing?” Goldman
Sachs Equity Research, Fortnightly Thoughts, June 5 2012.
30 Perrie M., “ Modernisation under the Tsars and the Soviets”,
Unpublished paper presented at the CREES Annual Conference, Cum-
berland Lodge, Windsor Great Park, 4–6 June 2010 presents a fascinating
overview.
31 See the Ukaz No. 579 in http://graph.document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?
ID¼52509 accessed on 20 May 2009.The liberal context of post-crisis structural reforms
Efforts to speed up the modernisation of the country
date back to the second mandate of Putin and need to be
assessed in that perspective. Major plans of modernisation
and diversiﬁcation (M&D) were contemplated in Putin’s
Concept-2020 – a long and detailed strategic programme –
launched on 21 July 2006 and ﬁnally approved on 17
November 2008.26 The concept envisaged the progressive
emancipation of Russia from dependence on energy. The
key drivers of this programme were to be innovation,
investment and infrastructure with an emphasis on inno-
vation in the ﬁnancial sector capable of developing in
Moscow an international ﬁnancial hub.
Awelcome focus on institutions was added byMedvedev
under his Presidential mandate although he never chal-
lenged Putin’s long-term policy goals. It is worth noting that
the institutional driver is not irrelevant in comparing the
pre- to the post-crisis approach to structural reforms as
discussed below. Medvedev pushed, as a President, and may
continue to push through the Parliament as a Premier, anti-
corruption laws complying by and large with OECD best
practices, also preparing for membership into this organi-
sation that should come after WTO membership. Those
include making income declarations obligatory for state
ofﬁcials, new provisions on state procurement, an area of
widespread corruption and bribery, higher test requirements
to enter police corps, interdiction to top state ofﬁcials to hold
managerial positions in state companies; facilities for foreign
direct investment; and a number of other reforms meant to
create if not the critical framework for amodern state at least
better grounds for implementation of the rule of law.
Important reforms to the Russian Civil Code have been
passed in the ﬁrst reading by the Duma on 27 April 2012
providing for more transparent regulations for corporate
entities, common law concepts of obligations and liabilities,
immovable property (to be sold together with premises as
an integrated object of transaction), the liability of internet
providers for IP infringements, etc.27 Some laws have been
passed, other are expected to pass; whilst some provisions26 See on this, Malle S. cit., pp.24–26 and the Conception of Long-Term
Development of the Russian Federation to 2020 in http://www.comission.
economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/strategicPlanning/concept/
concept accessed on 17 November 2008.
27 See http://www.russianlawonline.com/content/civil-code-reform
accessed on 31 May 2012.– notably on state procurement – encounter resistance.28
Nonetheless a process of change after many years of inac-
tion has been taking place. It is clear that even when
approved, reforms will take time to deliver, and could even
be reversed. But it would be wrong to dismiss efforts to
improve the institutional environment trying to respond to
the demands from both the more advanced sections of
society and the international community.29
While Medvedev also indulged in ruling from above, so
common to Russian history,30 – such as work done by the
Commission for Modernisation and Technological Devel-
opment (CMTD) that has been attached to the Presidential
Administration on May 20 2009 – 31 his interest for insti-
tutional change was altogether more evident. The CMTD
composed by inﬂuential government ofﬁcials, busi-
nessmen, state managers and experts used to meet
monthly to discuss progress in priority areas speciﬁcally
targeted for development and worked under instructions
from the President almost in parallel with similar initiatives
from Putin as a Premier whose visits (and patronising
benevolence) to large-scale factories were always reported
more prominently in the press. In June 2012 the CMTD has
been transformed into one of the many Presidential coun-
cils by Putin III – whose personal networks with industry
are multi-faceted and nation-wide – possibly losing status,
in so far that as Medvedev practically is to take responsi-
bility assuming this time, though, the chair of the
Presidium as mere chief of the government.32
The still untamed ﬁnancial crisis could help stimulate
a more market institutions-friendly approach. This clearly
surfaced in 2011 when 21 groups of experts, under the
direction of respected scholars Vladimir Mau and Iaroslav
Kuz’mynov, were charged by the then Premier Putin to
propose appropriate changes and amendments to the
Concept-2020.33 The ﬁrst draft of this document – Strategy-
2020 – was presented to the government on December
2011 and later published in the understanding that the
authors welcome comments. It is still unclear whether the
new government presided by Medvedev will adhere to the32 See http://www.kremlin.ru/news/14818 probably the last meeting of
the Commission accessed on 21 March 2012. See also http://www.
vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1853242/modernizaciyu_delyat_na_dvoih
accessed on 15 June 2012 discussing future options and on Putin’s deci-
sion to establish a council see http://ria.ru/economy/20120618/
676090489.html accessed on 18 June 2012.
33 See http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID¼1576907&Nodes
ID¼2 accessed on 31 January 2011.
37 See Silvana Malle, “The Policy Challenge of Russia’s Post-Crisis
Economy” Post-Soviet Affairs (PSA), 2012, 28, pp.79–81 for an appraisal
of the public debate and its unfolding character. This paper will be cited
thereafter as PSA.
38 See Frolov V., “A Medvedev Tea Party Could Be the Answer” The
Moscow Times, March 22, 2010. See also http://www.proﬁle.ru/items/?
item¼31987 accessed on 6 October 2011where Petr Orekhin argues that
different political visions between Putin and Medvedev could become the
foundations of a dual party system.
39 While in China in mid-April 2011 he afﬁrmed that his own “course is
modernisation of the economy and modernisation of the political life”,
seehttp://www.rg.ru/printable/2011/04/13/medvedev.html accessed on
20 April 2012.
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always adamant in stressing that the Strategy is not a pro-
gramme but the presentation of alternative options and
their possible effects on the economy, while it will be up to
the government to choose its own programme.34 At this
stage, two aspects can be easily discerned: ﬁrst, the Strategy
compared to the Concept is far more market-orientated
than the original document; second, rapid economic
diversiﬁcation is ruled out, sincemore than a decadewill be
needed during which time any structural change will have
to be ﬁnanced out of export revenues from natural
resources. This conclusion that could be seen as a rejection
of Medvedev’s calls for accelerated structural changes, as
discussed below, are probably simply a warning to all
policy-makers that solid market foundations, as described
in the revised document, need to be mutually consistent
and will take time for implementation. Strategy-2020 –
very ﬁrm on the need to maintain sound macroeconomic
fundamentals – seems also to be at odd with the MED’s
“innovation scenario” that projects oil revenues to the
budget to fall from 11% of GDP in 2011 to 5.3% of GDP in
2030. By a combination of a larger tax base, optimisation of
spending and selected cuts in expenditure the budget
deﬁcit should be contained within a range of 1.5–2.0% of
GDP, but the state debt would increase to 20–25% of GDP
(from c.9.7% of GDP in 2011).35 According to the MED the
share of non-primary goods in exports should increase in
the decade from 2020 to 2030 from 25% to 45%, but it is
unclear which factors would make it possible to turn the
Russian economy to a manufacturing economy in such
a short time, though market friendly structural reforms are
implicit in the innovation scenario.
It is possible, however, that generational changes foster
the realisation of a more liberal economy and society but
this would also need a liberal structure of power.
Relatively young Medvedev has been often portrayed as
a liberal compared to mature Putin, though the difference
between the two personalities might be more one of
emphasis than substance, considering that the mastermind
of Russian-style structural reforms has remained for quite
a while Vladislav Surkov, a Putin ally and from May 2012
deputy prime Minister in the newly formed Medvedev’s
government.36
On a would-be liberal agenda Medvedev scored some
points in his favour compared to Putin thanks to the seeds
of discontent with economic performance manifest in his
public speeches that fostered a debate on modernisation to
rapidly evolve into questioning the structure of power.
Whether intended or not, Medvedev’s criticism of an
economy that “to a large extent ignores the needs of the
people” forced both reform-minded experts and their34 See Vladimir Mau in http://strategy2020.rian.ru/news/20120120/
366250470.html, accessed on January 20 2012.
35 See the presentation of the two scenarios by Andrei Klepach of the
MED in http://www.nr2.ru/rus/382746.html/print/ and the MED’s
detailed scenarios and forecast to 2030 in http://www.economy.gov.ru/
minec/activity/sections/macro/prognoz/doc20120428_010.
36 See Vladimir Frolov, “Medvedev’s Motor to Drive Modernisation”,
The Moscow Times November 23, 2009.antagonists to start competing from different points of
view on criticism of the economy and its ruling.37
At the same time, efforts to capture protest and steer it
into more pragmatic purposes, appeared to coalesce around
Medvedev when occasional dissent from Putin on both
internal and foreignpolicy could be interpreted as to provide
the ground for an alternative party.38 Medvedev, indeed,
cautiously linked economic to political modernisation in
some ofﬁcial meetings.39 His occasional comments on the
need to broaden party representation in the regions suggest
that, fearing that criticism on the state of the economy could
backlash unless political changes were put in place, the
leadership started envisaging political arrangements that
would provide for an improved, though not necessarily
oppositional, political debate.
A dual party system could have helped, indeed, frame
the (hoped for) image of a country gradually moving out of
the inward-looking stigma impressed upon by the two ﬁrst
mandates of Putin. There were attempts to stimulate this
development.
Occasionally Shuvalov and Kudrin were pinpointed as
possible leaders of alternative parties.40 The billionaire
Mikhail Prokhorov tried unsuccessfully to take-over the
Right Cause Party in 2011.41With Kudrin ﬂatly dismissing
any party membership, both before, and after his departure
from the Ministry of Finance on September 2011, and
Shuvalov joining the All-Russian National Front created by
Putin in May 2011 (and discussed in the last section) the
electoral landscape remained broadly favourable to Edinaia
Rossiia that, despite having shrunk in numbers, won the
majority in the Duma elections of December 4 2011 and
remains, not without problems (discussed at the end of this
paper), the party of power whose ofﬁcial leader soon after
obtaining membership on 22 May 2012 has become
Medvedev.42
Cumbersome political developments suggest that
a liberal approach to modernisation and innovation is
unlikely to become pre-eminent unless major reforms in40 As possible leaders of Right Cause for Shuvalov see http://www.
vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/257257/igorya_shuvalova_vedut_
napravo accessed on 30 March 2011 and http://www.polit.ru/event/2011/
03/25/povorot_print.html accessed on 25 March 2011and for Kudrin in
http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/03/16/n_1748981.shtml accessed
on 16 March 2011.
41 See S. Malle, PSA 2012, cited, pp.82–84.
42 Noticeably, Medvedev had been the unofﬁcial leader of the party
since December 2011 elections when he accepted to drop out of the race
for a new Presidential term implicitly accepting Putin’s offer to become
the next Premier, see http://top.rbc.ru/politics/22/05/2012/651500.shtml?
print accessed on 22 May 2012.
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constituency for effective democracy with larger partici-
pation in, and accountability for, decision-making is still
insufﬁcient.45 See on Medvedev, The Moscow Times 9 March 2011 in http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/reading-medvedevs-mind/432208.
html and on Putin The Moscow Times 8 August 2011 in http://webcache.
googleusercontent.com/search?q¼cache:WTe2bTeykF4J:
themoscownews.com/politics/20110808/1889101.
46 On the number and proﬁle of international companies signing
memorandum of intents in Skolkovo, see S. Malle, PSA, p.87.
47 Ibidem, p.88. See also See C. Weaver, “Welcome to Russia’s Silicon
Valley” Financial Times, August 22 2011.
48 http://www.vedomosti.ru/ﬁnance/news/1369642/rashody_byudzheta_
na_skolkovo_prevysyat_27_mlrd_rub_v accessed on 19 Septmber 2011.
49 See http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1782731 accessed on 28
September 2011.
50 See http://news.kremlin.ru/news/15139/print accessed on 25 April
2012.
51 See http://www.themoscowtimes.com/topics/medvedevs-silicon-The M&D drive: Skolkovo, the agency of strategic
initiative and WTO
The Russian government’s efforts to speed up modern-
isation and upgrade the technological level of production in
many domains is multi-faceted. Some are better known
than others. All projects seem to be driven by a sentiment
of urgency where personal commitment to immediate
results seems to matter comparatively more than the
feasibility of each programme. Medvedev and Putin are
both engaged in modernisation programmes that, exam-
ined individually, appear to be neither well interrelated nor
mutually consistent. Implicit in all programmes is the belief
that little or nothing will develop unless the state inter-
venes. This section deals with two major programmes –
Skolkovo and the Agency for Strategic Initiative – and
concludes with some remarks on businesses sentiments on
modernisation and Russian entry into WTO. It is WTO
membership, indeed, that should be highlighted as a major
driver of structural reforms, but this major achievement is
rarely referred to by the authorities when the issue of M&D
is discussed.
Under President Medvedev the drive to M&D produced
results mainly in terms of organisation and memorandums
of intent. Among his initiatives, the major event is known
as Skolkovo, Russia’s equivalent to Silicon Valley: a national
project aimed to propel Russia into the modern IT-high
tech era in a decade by attracting brains and resources
from home and abroad.43 A memorandum of intent has
been signed with the US Michigan Institute of Technology
(MIT). Skolkovo enjoys preferential treatment in a number
of areas including allocation of land, material provision
related to residential housing and ofﬁces and easier access
to the release of licences. What clearly emerges from
Skolkovo developments that by the time Putin had come
back to Presidency in May 2012 remain mainly conﬁned to
projects, is the effort to push ahead with plans on inno-
vation despite a number of obstacles enshrined in existing
laws that must be modiﬁed in a short time to make the
project start. Medvedev’s warning that every step should
remain under his control suggests his strong personal
commitment to push forward innovation along schemes
that Russia had experienced with mixed results more than
once in her tsarist (Peter the Great, Catherine the Great,
Alexander II) and Soviet past.44 Historical parallels have
been used by both Medvedev and Putin to strengthen the
“national” foundations of their own projects. While Med-
vedev apparently found his inspirationmainly in Alexander43 According to President Medvedev’s sherpa A. Dvorkovich, Skolkovo
was expected to be working at full capacity in 5–7 years from 2010, see
http://www.rian.ru/economy/20100521/236891341-print.html accessed
on 26 May 2010. See on Skolkovo’s developments also S. Malle, PSA, cited,
pp.85–90.
44 See Perrie M., cit.II, Putin on some occasions referred to his predecessor
Pyotr Stolypin.45 Medvedev’s conﬁdence in this project was
probably supported by some improvements in the inter-
national climate that helped attract some major foreign
investors to Russia.46 While Medvedev’s projects of
modernisation and innovation stem from a top-down
approach typical of Russian history, his hope is that in
a short period of time Skolkovo’s resident companies will
move on to sign joint ventures with Russian partners with
no need for supplementary support from the state. The
projected cost to the budget has been estimated at about
$3billion from 2011 to 2014: not an extraordinary burden
compared to the budget of more than $650bn to 2020
assigned to the military as described above.47 The funds for
Skolkovo will be diminishing each year according to the
2012–2013 budget projections: from 27.1bn roubles in
2012 to 17.1bn roubles in 2013 in the expectation that
private businesses will gradually take over the cost of
ﬁnancing.48 However, luring big foreign companies into
ﬁnancing Skolkovo’s project is not always easy: BP, for
instance withdrew unexpectedly late September 2011 from
a project on “Intensiﬁcation of heat transfer and catalysis”
where it was supposed to provide, on a 50/50 deal with
Skolkovo, £6.7m.49 State companies are neither eager to
have deals with Skolkovo: a complaint raised by Medvedev
who also lamented red tape in screening the applications
and the lack of expertise in evaluating some projects.50 A
few large-scale Russian companies, like Lukoil and KamAZ
that committed to develop in Skokovo own R&D pro-
grammes, may have had no choice.51 Interestingly,
following Medvedev’s critical comments, it has been
envisaged in March 2012 that Russian state companies
transfer to Skolkovo’s Development Fund 1% of their R&D
budget.52
By 31 March 2012, despite problems mentioned above,
the record of Skolkovo on paper appeared to be moderately
successful with 427 registered resident companies, 100
grants assigned for a total sum of 6.3bn roubles and thevalley/403389.html accessed on 25 May 2012 on Lukoil and http://top.
rbc.ru/economics/18/05/2012/651102.shtml on KamAZ accessed on 18
May 2012.
52 See A. Dvorkovich’s reference to $1bn to be earmarked in three years
to the Skolkovo Scientiﬁc Fund, thanks to donations from companies such
as Gazprom, Aeroﬂot, RusHydro and the Railways company RZD in http://
rt.com/business/news/russia-skokovo-skoltech-innovation-069/print/
accessed on 21 March 2012.
59 See on the need not only for property, but for property rights, to
ensure a digniﬁed life, M. Trubolyubov in http://www.vedomosti.ru/
opinion/news/1355034/zadacha_novogo_pokoleniya on 2 September
2011.
60 It is worth noting that a number of technological parks created
around Moscow thanks to state were expected to become in time self-
ﬁnanced business centres, but de facto only few managed to survive
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Information technology and telecommunications are
among the most attractive clusters.54
Nonetheless, the problem remains as to whether this
and similar projects55 that are being discussed in some
regions will help build a critical mass of truly new high tech
projects, processes and products to help kick off the
demand for, and the diffusion of new techniques all over
the economy in order to bring Russia in reasonable time at
par at least with the two other major BRICs economies –
China and Brazil – that on innovation have been moving
much faster. While China has been climbing in the global
ranking on innovation from 43 to 29 and Brazil from 68 to
47 in one year, from 2010 to 2011. Russia was still lagging
behind in 2011, albeit her ranking improved from 64 to 56
in the same period.56 All in all, the lack of expertise in
judging certain R&D applications, as mentioned by Vek-
selberg, the Skolkovo’s CEO, is revealing. That could
become, indeed, a major obstacle to innovation pro-
grammes run from above.57 The question of how inde-
pendent, “independent” examiners can be in the Russian
context, is not a minor one either.
The chances of success from a horizontal industrial
policy based on institutions that would promote a favour-
able business development are no doubt higher than those
of government traditional industrial policy as such. None-
theless, there are also arguments in favour of the latter on
the score of several countries’ experience, such as China,
Israel, Chile and even the Silicon Valley in California.58-
Transport infrastructure, railways and motorways in
particular, in many Western European countries has been
ﬁnanced by the state. Tax incentives are still massively used
to promote investment in the areas of climate change and
energy savings.
But there are problems with traditional industrial policy
that Russia, in particular, should not ignore. First, innova-
tion is fostered only by competition. Few would engage in
costly (and not always or immediately successful) R&D if
theywere not afraid that their competitors could beat them
by moving earlier. The lack of interest for modernisation/
innovation in Russia reﬂects by and large a non-
competitive environment. Second, when a new high tech
product/process develops, there is the question of how to
ensure its diffusion in the economy as a whole. This was
a problem also in Soviet Union where, sophisticated53 See the meeting on Skolkovo at the Bauman Institute convened by
Medvedev on 25 April 2012 in http://news.kremlin.ru/news/15139/print
accessed on the same day.
54 See http://www.polit.ru/news/2012/03/28/jump_skolkovo_400/
print/ accessed on 28 March 2012.
55 See the performance of other regions on innovation in http://www.
ng.ru/printed/266971 accessed on 27 March 2012 and plans for the
creation of a brand new R&D town-centre at Innopolis (Tatarstan) ex-
pected to host 155,000 people from other regions and from abroad, see
http://government.ru/docs/19246/print/ accessed on 12 June 2012.
56 See http://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii/GII%20COMPLETE_
PRINTWEB.pdf, p.xviii accessed on 25 May 2012.
57 At the meeting with Medvedev on 25 April 2012, see FN 76.
58 See Rodrik Dani ,One Economics. Many Recipes. Globalization, Insti-
tutions and Economic Growth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007,
pp. 99–152.military technologies remained conﬁned to defence,
contrary to the West where competition normally help
speeding up the pace of technological change by adapting
defence-related innovation to civilian output. Third, the
innovation process may turn out to be simply too costly and
fundamental research not properly protected under
Russian IPR legislation and enforcement, a still problematic
area.59 There is also a risk that money be wasted in re-
inventing the wheel. Finally, rushing to show that
they conform to modernisation and innovation dogmas,
there could be herding and window dressing by
local administrations in competing for project-clusters,
rather than concentrating on how to improve market
institutions.60
On a separate path, Putin as the chairman of the
government (2008–2012), set up in 2011 his own agency,
the Agency of Strategic Initiative (ASI), with the aim of
engaging Ministers and banks’ directors to provide support
to talented young business people striving to set up and/or
to further develop their own undertakings.61 Underlying
such initiative was Putin’s hope that in 10 year from 2011
the share of high tech in total output will increase from 12%
to 25–35%.62The Agency is supposed not to cost anything to
the budget and develop out of donors’ funding and/or other
sources of off-budget ﬁnancing. But in the Russian envi-
ronment where state control is pervasive costs and possible
losses are likely be borne by state controlled ﬁnancial
institutions and “loyal ”commercial banks.63 The Sberbank
– that promised to invest $800 million to build a techno
park in Skolkovo – has also been called to help ﬁnancing
the ASI’s projects.64 It is yet unclear whether any level of
state administration will also be asked to provide own
guarantees and bear the burden of contingent liabilities.
For the time being, there are not spectacular results from
ASI. The website of the Agency lists all the projects that
have been approved by its committee, but there is no
indication of whether the projects have been ﬁnanced and/and develop this way, whilst the other disappeared pointing to waste of
money, see http://polit.ru/news/2012/03/28/jump_tehnopark2018/
accessed on 28 March 2012.
61 See on this Putin’s presentation in http://premier.gov.ru/events/
news/15348/ and a summary of the tasks and means devoted to this
project in http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2011/05/25/focus/562949980304986/
print/ accessed on 25 May 2011. See also Malle, PSA, cited, pp.88–89 for
more details on the local organisations and scope of ASI.
62 See Putin instructing the Ministry for Industry and Trade to provide
for high tech in machine building through recommendations on either
state purchase or output, http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/
260055/tabachnyj_kollajder accessed on 12 May 2011.
63 See on the role of the VEB and estimated costs of ASI http://www.
vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/262487/proekt_putina accessed on 21
June 2011.
64 See http://ru.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idRURXE76B01Z20
110712 on 12 July 2011 and http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/
1330856/gref_pomozhet_putinu reporting the appointment of Gref to
the supervisory committee of ASI, on 2 August 2011.
70 The budget will be hit ﬁrst. Losses due to cut in tariffs have been
estimated by the MOF at about 310bn roubles in 2013 (c.$1.5bn) see
http://www.rg.ru/2012/06/08/budjet-site.html accessed on 12 June
2012.
71 On the beneﬁts of WTO membership my main source is Richard
Connolly, (2012)‘The Economic Signiﬁcance of Russia’s Accession to the
World Trade Organisation,’ External Report for the European Parliament,
S. Malle / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 78–99 87or materialised.65 According to the ASI’s CEO Nikitin, each
week the Agency receives about 40 projects. Around 70
projects have met the criteria of the agency by end 2011
and 40 of them have been approved by the advisory
council. But only 10 are being pursued thanks to speciﬁc
measures of support. The projects range from technical
applications, such as for instance energy saving pipelines,
to social initiatives including the establishment of nurs-
eries, kindergartens and similar institutions.66
Interestingly, though, some participants started com-
plaining that in order to be able to improve the business
climate and cut costs, major reforms must be carried out in
the areas of energy infrastructure, access to unused
municipal land and customs procedures that remain
excessively cumbersome for small businesses.67 This
suggests that in time a lobby for market-friendly reforms
may arise and ﬁght for new provisions and accountability
for implementation. Comparing individual success may
also help. An Annual Forum on Innovation Progress was
planned to be launched in 2012 under the supervision of
Surkov that continues to be in charge of modernisation in
the government led by Medvedev from May 2012.68
While it is difﬁcult to predict whether Skolkovo and ASI
projects will survive under the Putin III, it is noteworthy
that, according to Surkov – and despite the relative back-
lash of ER in December 2011 elections – Skolkovo as the
main hub for innovationwas to remain in the government’s
agenda.69 Moreover, judging from Putin’s long-term
economic policy programme, the approach to innovation
from above does not appear to have changed.
Neither Skolkovo nor ASI seem to be fully consistent
with WTO membership that should bring about stronger
competitive pressures and easier access to foreign tech-
nology due to lower import duties in a number of areas,
such as automotive industry, aircraft, machinery,
construction equipment, electrical machinery, plastics,
agricultural equipment and other. Such government
initiatives might have been undertaken precisely in the
belief that the economy should be strengthened and
entrepreneurship encouraged before accession to WTO –
and the consequent fall of the average tariff from 10% in
2011 to 7.8% – hoping that a stronger economy would help
tame opposition to WTO.
There is no strong constituency for liberalisation in
Russia. While on the consumer side, it is easy to predict
beneﬁts from lower prices and higher quality, on the
production side worries, justiﬁed by concerns for low
competitiveness and productivity of labour, have been
increasing.65 See http://asi.ru/view_projects/done_projects/.
66 See http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/17335/print/ accessed on 9
December 2011.
67 See http://www.rg.ru/printable/2012/04/27/biznes.html accessed on
24 April 2012.
68 See http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2012/04/05/n_2277781.
shtml.
69 http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1457261/surkov_
innovacionnoe_razvitie_rf_ostanetsya_aktualnym_i accessed on 19
December 2012.Beneﬁts from WTO membership may not accrue to the
Russian economy in the very short-term,70 but a number of
experts estimate that there will be signiﬁcant beneﬁts in
the medium-long term provided that the economy adapts
to the requirements of a competitive market economy, i.e.
to WTO requirements.71 The OECD estimates that costs to
business should fall by $900bn with an additional $10–15
to 18bn coming from more effective law enforcement on
the part of Russia.72 While some sectors will suffer more
than others from increased competition, exporters may
gain from better market access for their output. Ex-ante, it
is difﬁcult to assess how fast the Russian economy will be
able to adapt. Prima facie, considering the structure of the
economy and the lack of market-orientated reforms in
recent years, one could bet on a difﬁcult process of adap-
tation. However, it is worth noting that very high (and
immediate) beneﬁts from international trade and foreign
investment to China after WTO membership came unex-
pected to most. One should not rule out positive outcomes
for Russia as well, mainly in ﬁelds where fundamental
research is still strong and may help to foster specialised/
niche R&D. After all, success stories like that of Yandex or
Kaspersky, privately owned companies both engaged in
internet technology and security, suggest that the potential
for innovation and growth may be higher than commonly
referred to, especially in the tertiary sector. But other
sectors – including those that need foreign components for
their output – may also gain.73On the side of state
companies, many of which are rightly blamed for inefﬁ-
ciency, Rosatom stands out for good performance, being the
world’s 4th largest nuclear electricity generation producer,
while providing 40% of the world uranium enrichment
services.74 Notably, this is also a company that may support
rapid modernisation in the area of medical equipment as
desired by the government. Both Rosnano and Rosatom (of
which more below) stand out for the open approach to
learning from foreign companies. WTO may facilitate
cooperation fostering technological change. Among the
many projects in which its 250 companies are engaged,
Rosatom, for instance, will produce tomography equipmentBrussels & Strasbourg: European Parliament June 2012. Downloadable
from. poldep-expo@europarl.europa.eu.
72 See Belousov on WTO’s effects at the government meeting on 7 June
2012 in http://government.ru/docs/19194/, and D. Tarr and N. Volchkova,
“Russian Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Policy at the Crossroad”,
The World Bank. Research Development Group. Trade and Integration
Team, Policy Research Working Paper 5255, March 2010 who estimated
that Russia will gain about $53bn per year in the medium term and
$177bn per year in the long term due largely to her own commitments to
reforms in its own business service sectors.
73 See Editorial, “A Genuine Success Story Made in Russia”, The Moscow
Times 26 May 2011.
74 See http://www.jmu.ru/en/index.php?cid¼44 accessed on June 2,
2020.
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cally advanced in this area.75
While the implementation of grand innovation/invest-
ment projects will take time,76 two areas of reforms could
have faster impact on economic structure and performance
and help shape the contours of “modern” Russia in the near
future: the privatisation of costly state entities and FDI
policy. Medvedev set the stage for the transformation of
large scale state entities under special regime into joint stock
companies that could be gradually privatised in the future.
Putin promised to carry on with the privatisation pro-
gramme approved under Medvedev’s Presidency, although
with some caveat. Both have been looking forward to
increase the share of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to
foster progress. As discussed below, such reforms are met
with resistance from powerful vested interests in the status
quo. At the plenary meeting of the Duma on 8 May 2012
whenMedvedev was appointed premier of the government,
Putin III had to step forcefully in the discussion against
opposition parties critical of privatisation programmes,
foreign investment and entry into WTO.77In that context
Putin’s speech sounded cautious with regard to beneﬁts
from the accession to WTO – that, however – he warned –
was on the agenda – but aggressive in stressing that foreign
investment and joint ventures with highly performing
foreign partner would, indeed, be beneﬁcial. Finally, trying
perhaps to ﬁnd some common grounds with unusually rude
opposition, Putin pointed to the integration of the post-
soviet economic space as a number one priority.78
Putin III’s improvised reaction to the opposition chal-
lenging the government policy is perhapsmore telling about
his 2012–2018 agenda than the several programmes and
decrees that marked the starting of his third mandate. In
forcefully challenging the Communist Party – de facto the
only meaningful opposition in the Duma – Putin made clear
what the cornerstones of Russian policy until 2018 will be75 See http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/262425/rosatom_
protiv_raka accessed on 20 June 2011.
76 A. Dvkovich optimistically projects that it will take from 5 to 7 years
to Russia to become a leader in new technology, see http://www.rg.ru/
printable/2010/12/13/dvorkovich-anons.html accessed on 13 December
2010.
77 See http://news.kremlin.ru/news/15266/print accessed 8 May 2012.
On this project see a rather positive assessment by A. Rahr, “The Eurasian
Union offer Candidates more incentives than the EU” in http://valdaiclub.
com/near_abroad/39940.html accessed on 14 March 2012. Showing
approval for Russia’s regional policies and criticism for excessive concern
in the West, see F. Lukyanov, “The Eurasian Union. A Reiterated priority”,
published on 28.12.2011 in http://valdaiclub.com/near_abroad/36740.
htmlOn some positive (budgetary) effects from turning illegal into legal
immigration, particular if poor countries such as Kyrghystan and
Tajikistan enter the Union. see http://www.eabr.org/general//upload/
docs/CCI/migration-resume-eng.pdf accessed on 25 May 2012.
78 Putin, presenting his report on government policy in 2011 at the
Duma on 11 April 2012 stressed that the formation of the tripartite
Customs Union (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) just approved and the
Eurasian Economic union to be launched in 2015 “represent the most
important geopolitical and integration feature in the post-soviet space
from the time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, see http://
premier.gov.ru/events/news/18671/. See also the approval by the
Duma’s speaker Naryshkhin, in http://er.ru/news/2012/5/17/naryshkin-
sozdana-rabochaya-gruppa-po-podgotovke-sozdaniya-evrazijskogo-
parlamenta/ accessed on 17 May 2012.under his ruling. Putin remained cautious on privatisation,
pointing to persisting state property of strategic sectors, like
oil, in several OECD and non-OECD member countries. He
also reminded the communist opposition that while the
Russian state intended to keep a controlling stake in such
sectors, it was obvious that foreign partnership was needed.
Putin, ﬁnally, warned the audience that the geopolitical
dimension of Russian economics and politics was his
primary concern: a clear message to government colleagues
and businessmen at home primarily, but also intended for
a broader international audience.The privatisation dilemma
From 2000 onwards until the ﬁnancial crisis hit Russia
privatisation had almost disappeared from the government
agenda. Privatisation revenues fell from a top of 2% of the
budget (2000) to a low of 0.4% (2009).79 New develop-
ments in this area emerged in 2009–2011 under the pres-
sure of falling ﬁscal revenues and ﬁscal imbalances.
Interestingly,while in early 2009 the government seemed
to be still preoccupied with national security in devising
privatisation plans, thus ruling out sales of major state banks
or production companies, such concerns weakened by the
end of the year when it became clear that growth and
investmenthadcollapsedand the roomfor subsidising failing
enterprises out of the stabilisation funds had badly shrunk.
Two privatisation plans – one approved on 30 November
2009and the secondannouncedby thegovernmenton26 July
2010 – opened the room for the privatisation of important
stakes in a number of formerly listed as strategic companies
after in April 2010 Medvedev had approved by decree the
reduction of the number of strategic join stock companies
from 211 to 41 and the number of unitary state enterprises
(utilities) from 230 to 159.80 Non-controlling stakes in ten
large scale state companies, including, among others, Rosneft,
Transneft, Sberbank, VTB, Rossel’khozbank, Rosagrolizing,
RusGidroandRussianRailroadswere listed tobesoldbetween
2011 and 2013.81 The Ministry of Finance estimated that over
2010–2013 a total of about 1 trillion roubles (983bn exactly), c.
US$33bnwould be earmarked to the budget.82
Many IPOs planned sales were cancelled in 2010 and
2011 due to unfavourable market developments; some did
take place, but with revenues from sales lower than initial
estimates. Only in few cases sales were successful. Even the
London based IPO of the well-known Russian Helicopters
company, planned for 11 May 2011 was cancelled due to
lack of interest of the part of investors.8379 See detailed diagram in http://www.1prime.ru/news/articles/http/
www.1prime.ru/-201/%7BA3089D77-5788-4E8C-8398-2F074719C7DF%7D.
uif.
80 See for details on the companies and number of shares to be offered
for sale, Malle S. PSA, cited, pp.97,102.
81 See Financial Times, 27 July and 2 August 2010 and http://www.ﬁniz.
ru/news/article1270655/?print accessed on 12 August 2012.
82 See http://www.rian.ru/economy/20100805/262018664.html accessed
on 5 August 2010. The conventional exchange rate used here is 30 rouble
to the US$.
83 See http://top.rbc.ru/economics/11/05/2011/589981.shtml accessed
on 11 May 2011.
89 See the scheme in Izvestiia 26 February 2010 in http://www.izvestia.
ru/economic/article3138982/index.html.
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late August 2011 a plan for privatising 21 (potentially) prof-
itable companies was announced, including large scale
companies in energy and diamonds, some of which are to be
fully divested by the state. A rough estimate of revenues from
this sale – $75bn – suggests that much progress has been
done in setting the stage for a major divestment of state
property. Unfortunately, once again, market developments
have turned unfavourable from the end of 2011 and look
likely to discourage the authorities from taking long-awaited
action in theﬁeld asplanned for 2012–2013. Theprivatisation
plans for 2011 were fulﬁlled by 42%; large scale privatisation
didnot takeplace and revenues to the budgetweremuch less
than expected.84 The wait and see government (and MOF)
position has been criticised by many in Russia, from Gref,
head of Sberbank to Dvorkovich and Shuvalov, who focused
on collateral beneﬁt for institutional improvement, apart
from budget revenues from privatisation.85 Despite govern-
ment assurance that privatisationplanswill not be cancelled,
Gref at the timeof thiswriting,wasstillwaiting for thevisaon
the privatisation of his bank’s package of shares.86
The revised Strategy-2020 dated 22 November 2011
pointed to the still paramount presence of the state in the
economy through state participation in companies andbanks
and control of state entities despite a reduction in the
number of state enterprises as such. The share of the state in
market capitalisation was estimated to have increased from
24% to 40%between2004 and2007 reaching c.50% in2009.87
The privatisation of state entities known as goskorpor-
atsii (GK) deserve special consideration; ﬁrst, because of
the intriguing nature of such entities, and second, because
of their questionable importance for security. Not all of
them have been listed for privatisation and, when listed,
privatisation schedules are frequently changed under the
pressure of vested interests in their survival.
GK are large state holdings, frequently in control of
hundreds of production units, set up under special regime
in their speciﬁc branch. These entities were set up under
Putin’s second presidential mandate. Their managers
appointed by the government were not made accountable
for economic outcomes, they could incur losses, avoiding84 See http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20120521104309.shtml
accessed on 21 May 2012.
85 See Gref’s position in http://ria.ru/economy/20111121/493989685.
html accessed on 21 November 2011; Dvorkovich’s position in http://
www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1600923/privatizaciya_goskompanij_
v_rf_budet_idti_po_planu#ixzz1r4bKsNCy accessed on 4 April 2012 and
Shuvalov backing the long awaited privatisation of 7.6% shares of Sber-
bank in 2012 as planned, in http://ria.ru/economy/20120416/627689178.
html accessed on 16 April 2012 while about a monthlater Ulyukaev in
London, vice governor o the Central Bank, ruled out Sberbank’s projected
sales, see http://ria.ru/economy/20120522/655437860.html accessed on
22 May 2012. On Shuvalov later aligning with the wait and see position of
the Central Bank (the effective owner of the controlling package of shares
(57.58%)) see http://www.ng.ru/printed/269613 accessed on 8 June 2012.
At last Sberbank managed to sell its packet of shares in September 2012.
86 http://www.vestiﬁnance.ru/articles/10596.
87 See http://2020strategy.ru/data/2011/12/02/1214531946/%D0%93%
D1%80%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BF%D0%B015_%D1%84%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%
B0%D0%BB3.pdf accessed on 2 December 2011.
88 See for more details on goskorporatsii Malle S., “The Impact of the
Financial Crisis in Russia”, cit., pp.15–20.nonetheless bankruptcy procedures. GK enjoy ﬁscal and
tariff preferences.88 By the combination of economic and
political power these entities easily accessed state subsidies
that helped them survive the economic crisis.
In November 2009 Medvedev announced that some GK
will be transformed into joint-stock companies under 100%
state control and others will be liquidated after completion
of their tasks.
While in principle enforcing a new legal framework
should not be difﬁcult, it has become clear that GK
restructuring will take time89 and that some will remain
under state control for a quite a while. The ofﬁcial reason is
that they perform a number of different functions that will
need to be separated before undertaking radical reforms,90
but of course vested interests in the status quo also matter.
By February 2010 the time schedule for GK restructuring
was agreed and published.91 A relative long timetable for
change allows GK to increase their assets in the meantime.
It is worth noting that Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are
not always proﬁtable to GK which are supposed to abide by
government policy and, if this is the case, to incorporate
unproﬁtable companies. Under the tacit understanding
with the government the losses incurred this way are due
to the tasks they are required to perform in support of
social and economic stability, GK try to exploit that to their
advantage. Thus, one way or the other, the sheer number of
enterprises a major state holding succeeds to put under
control becomes a source of large economic and political
power. Rostekhnologii with its 562 Russian enterprises
under control, of which more than 300 work for state
defence, has been particularly active in M&A.92 It is now
trying also to get state contracts for the establishment of
medical/oncological centre, within a programme that
ﬁgures out as a priority for long-term economic policy.93
Rostekhnologii and Rosatom have been given a highly
preferential treatment in the programmes and schedule for
privatisation. Rostekhnologii is likely to remain for a long90 See Minecom’s programmes as reported in http://www.rg.ru/
printable/2010/02/25/korporacii.html accessed on 25 February 2010.
91 Two GK- the Fund for Communal Housing and Olimpstroi (overseeing
construction for the Winter Olimpics planned for 2014 – were set to be
liquidated in 2013 and 2015 respectively. Rosatom (nuclear energy) is to
remain in force with legal changes eventually introduced after 2011.
Decision on the legal status of VEB (Vneshekonombank) – to become either
a joint stock company (JSC) or a public company –was postponed to end-
2012. No deadline has been set for the Deposit Insurance Company to be
transformed into a public agency. Rosnano (nanotechnology), Rostekhno-
logii (advanced technology) and Rosavtodor (motorways) were set to
become joint stock companies in 2014 (the ﬁrst) and 2015 (the other two).
Actually, Rosnano, managed by Chubais, was transformed into a 100% state
ownership JSC inMarch 2011. See http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/05/12/
rosnano.html accessed on 12 May 2010and http://top.rbc.ru/economics/
11/03/2011/557582.shtml?print accessed on 11 March 2011.
92 See S. Malle, PSA, pp.91–93 for a detailed description of deals pursued
by Chemezov, the long-standing head of this GK until mid-2011. By May
2012 the number of companies and workers were about 600 of which 60%
working for defence and about 800,000 workers employed, cfr. Putin in
http://news.kremlin.ru/news/15373/print accessed on 18 May 2012.
93 Finance with more than a billion roubles by the government, http://
www.rostechnologii.ru/archive/0/detail.php?ID¼11516&print¼y accessed
on 18 May 2012.
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ment of its companies – many of which otherwise will get
bankrupt. Concerning Rosatom that, in the ﬁeld of nuclear
energy, appears to have acquired an increasingly evident
geopolitical role, much like Gazprom in its own ﬁeld, there
are no plans of privatisation in a foreseeable future. Rosnano
is also practically to remain under state control for a while:
originally (August 2011) only 10% of JSC Rosnano’s shares
were envisaged for sale late in 2017. This deadline may be
shortened in the light of new privatisation plans worked out
in 2012. Nonetheless, private shareholders are unlikely to
gain a controlling stake. Whether explicit – though govern-
ment agreements or implicitly, such major GK are perceived
as by foreign investors and lending institutions as public
organisations whose loans beneﬁt from sovereign guaran-
tees; GK are therefore in a comparatively better position to
access the international ﬁnancial market for capital and will
continue taking advantage of this favourable situation.
In the new government’s plans still to be clearly deﬁned
– before submitting for approval to the Duma – the trans-
formation of GK into JSCs and their successive privatisation
stand as a priority as announced by Medvedev at the ﬁrst
meeting of the government. Medvedev listed the privati-
sation of the companies already approved for sale as his
sixth – out of seven – priority according to a new schedule,
making clear, however that the actual sales will depend on
the developments in the ﬁnancial markets.94 By decree
Putin instructed the government to prepare byNovember 1,
2012 changes to privatisation plans for 2011–2013 and
approve the plan of privatisation for 2014–2016.95 The
newly appointed Minister of Economic Development A.
Belousov clariﬁed that the companies slated for privatisa-
tion, implicitly referring to non-strategic companies, in the
next 3–5 months did not need the approval of the Presi-
dent.96 Putin, indeed, had formerly approved decree on the
privatisation of energy companies 2013–2015 that are
considered to be strategic, and therefore under his
responsibility, foreseeing, however, a certain amount of
consolidation in the sector under the advice of former ﬁrst
deputy-minister Igor Sechin appointed head of Rosneft
after falling out of the Medvedev’s government.97 While94 see http://government.ru/docs/19003/ accessed 21 May 2012.
95 See http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1930174?stamp¼63472185668
2120029 accessed on 9 May 2012.
96 MED had listed already by 28 May 2012 the stakes to be privatised in
3–5 months. The list includes 7.58% minus one share of Sberbank, up to 49%
shares of the United Grain Company, up to 10% shares of Rosnano, up to 25%
minus one share of Sovkomﬂot (shipbuilding) and indeﬁnite number of
shares of Alrosa (diamonds). Apparently also amber producing concerns are
considered for privatisation. See as accessed on the same day http://www.
gazeta.ru/business/news/2012/05/28/n_2362457.shtmlhttp://www.gazeta.
ru/business/news/2012/05/28/n_2362861.shtml.
97 For details on developments in the ﬁeld of energy companies, see
http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2012/05/24/4599105.shtml accessed on
24 May 2012.
98 The Wall Street Journal complained about the confusion created by
contradictory announcement concerning privatisation in the sector versus
immediate consolidation plans, see issue 25May 2012. Adding to confusion
is the Sechin’s appointment to Head of the Presidential Commission in
chargeof strategic issuesofdevelopmentof fuel/energy (TEK)andecological
safety, see http://www.kremlin.ru/news/15656. The Commission has very
broad powers including norms, tax, tariffs, prices and utilisation of subsoil.privatisation in this sector is ofﬁcially postponed due to
unfavourable market developments, it is unclear whether
such moves aim at keeping the energy sector under state
control indeﬁnitely.98 A number of federal state unitary
enterprises operating in the ﬁeld of cartography have also
been excluded from privatisation.99 A more positive – and
somewhat unexpected – development could take place,
however, concerning Rostekhnologii after Putin warned the
holding that it could not sit forever on its own assets and
demanded a plan for the commercialisation of its compa-
nies to be prepared in view of their future privatisation.100
The main guidelines on privatisation over 2011–2013
by Premier Medvedev have been laid down on 7 June 2012
and detailed by the newly appointed Minister of the
Economic Development, Andrei Belousov.101 The number
and quality of assets planned for sale is very large. In
synthesis this concerns: package of shares of 1408 JSCs, as
well as shares of public companies with state participation
the total number of which is 2714. The number of shares
for sale are 1300, including 7.4 package of shares
belonging to the charter capital of such companies. To
prepare for further sales the government also plans to
commercialise 278 Federal State Unitary enterprises out of
a total of 2427. Belousov also detailed the schedule of sales
in 2012 and 2013, noting that the privatisation of the bank
VTB package of shares in 2011 had earmarked 95.7bn
roubles out of a total of 121bn from whole assets sold in
that year. By September 2012 30bn roubles were expected
to the budget from the sales of 200 small and medium size
enterprises and a small number of large enterprises. Large,
and more proﬁtable companies, were announced for sale
in the “near future”, including the long awaited packages
from Sberbank (7.58 minus one share that would impair
majority control by the CB that opposes the deal, as
mentioned earlier), Sovkomﬂot (25% minus one share),
Alrosa (undetermined)102, United Grain Co. (49%) and
Rosnano (10%).
More interestingly, but postponed up to 2016, there are
plans for total divestment of state property in a number of
banks (VTB and Rosselkhozbank), as well as giant99 See http://www.1prime.ru/news/0/%7BA42AF889-882F-4728-A95E-
05608F6DBCB8%7D.uif?print¼1 accessed on 30 May 2012 .The issue may
stir conﬂicts in the government. Interestingly, Dvorkovich, as a deputy-
premier in charge of energy, among other, intervened critically on
speciﬁc issues, such as the consolidation in the oil sector prospected by
Putin and Sechin and on the opportunity to decrease state participation in
the Sberbank to a blocking stake complying with following Strategy-2020
advice to divest a much large package of shares to allow this bank to
restructure and become more competitive.
100 See http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20120518194437.shtml accessed
on 18 May 2012also noting that by 1 March 2013 Putin expected to be
informed about the efﬁciency gained from consolidation of many state
companies. See also http://news.kremlin.ru/news/15373/print accessed on
18 May 2012.
101 See Government Meeting in http://government.ru/docs/19194/
accessed on 7 June 2012.
102 According to Shuvalov the proceedings from sale of this huge dia-
mond company (30% of world output) would be used to ﬁnance infra-
structure in the territory (Yakutiia) of its location, see http://expert.ru/
2012/06/7/chuvstvitelnyij-vopros/?n¼666 accessed on 9 June 2012
implicitly meaning that the federal budget will renounce its (majority)
share of revenues from sale.
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companies the statewants to keep a golden share or a small
non-controlling number of shares. In other companies,
such as Railways, FSK EEC (innovation company for elec-
tricity) and Transneft, the state intends to retain 75% plus
one share; state participation has been lowered to 50% plus
one share in the United shipbuilding corporation, OAK
(United Aircraft Corporation) and Uralvagozavod (Machine
building/defence). Finally the list of enterprises and stakes
planned for sale in 2012–13 was approved by the govern-
ment on 20 June 2012 along the lines exposed by Belousov
but with no details on effective deadlines and or caveat on
adverse market developments despite warnings by
experts.103
As mentioned earlier, all these plans are somewhat
dependent on market developments, not unlike highly
indebted countries in Europe, despite reiterated commit-
ment to sell by the Russian authorities. While for many
European countries, however, the main concern is ear-
marking enough to help ﬁscal balance in order to be able to
honour public debt, Russia should be worrying more about
how to increase efﬁciency and competitiveness, advertise
and speed up sales even in a less than highly favourable
environment.
Are foreign investors ﬁnally welcome?
Unlike other post-communist countries, and China,
Russia has never shown much sympathy for foreign
investors, in particular foreign direct investment (FDI). In
the nineties the latter were practically non-existent. The
situation appeared to be changing in 2000s. FDI increased
from US$2.7bn in 2000 to US$72.8bn (including 65.4US$bn
in the non-ﬁnancial sector) in 2008.104 According to inde-
pendent research, the volume of FDI accumulated in the
country as of the beginning of 2011 was $116.2 billion.105
Though not impressive in absolute terms, the rate of
increase has been signiﬁcant. Such developments have
occurred despite on-going complaints against corruption,
bureaucratic harassment and poor business environment.
An overview of the main indexes and rankings that are
supposed to be relevant for foreign investments seem to
reveal altogether little progress in a number of areas of
potential concern to investment, though the increasing
openness of Russia to the world may help bring in favour-
able changes.
Russia in 2011 still ranks 143rd only on 182 for
(perceptions on) corruption even after moving 11 ranks103 For an immediate grasp on what will be on sale and when, see
a nicely done diagram inhttp://www.itar-tass.com/g51/2394.html
accessed on 9 June 2012. The list of companies/stakes for sale (Raspor-
azhenie of 20 iunia 2012 [. No1035-r) can be found in http://government.
ru/gov/results/19431/. On doubts that the time for privatisation was well
chosen by Medvedev, see some experts’ critical views in http://www.ng.
ru/printed/270069.
104 Based on Russia’s Central Bank as reported in http://www.cbr.ru/
statistics/print.aspx?ﬁle¼credit_statistics/inv_in-country.htm and http://
www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/03/01/226955 both accessed
on 1st March 2010.
105 See S. Kulikov, “Investors avoid many regions”, Nezavisimaia Gazeta,
31 August 2011.upwards from the previous year.106 On the World Bank’s
“Doing Business Index 2011, Russia’s ranking is 120
compared to China 91, Brazil 126 and India 132.107
Nonetheless other aspects may have become more
favourable. The 2012 FDI Conﬁdence Index reports that
emerging markets have eclipsed developed countries in
terms of FDI inﬂows, absorbing more than half of global FDI
inﬂows for the ﬁrst time in history, and now comprisemore
than half of the Index’s top 25 countries.108 Russia did even
better than many OECD countries and quite a few other
emerging market economies (EMEs), but not China, India
and Brazil ranking respectively 1st, 2nd and 3rd, ﬁnally
attaining the 12th position in 2012, 6 ranks higher than in
2010 (18th) and returning close to the 9th position attained
in 2007. While Russia is still far behind the other three
BRICs’, the fact that 19% of the respondents estimated that
the situation compared to the previous year was improving
versus 13%manifesting an opposite view, shows that Russia
is making progress in the view of foreign investors though
not enough to become comparatively more attractive than
other large EMEs. While, in 2012, the severe Freedom
House for the ﬁrst time in 8 years estimated that the
freedom of the press had not worsened, Russia still scores
rather badly (172nd on 197).109
Conversely, the country ranks rather well (47th on 208)
on the Globalisation-2012 Index– albeit due more to posi-
tive social and political interaction rather than in the
economic ﬁeld– and much better than China (73rd), Brazil
(74th) and India (110th).110 Taking into account her long
history of self-seclusion and economic autarchy, Russia
appears to be open to integration and capable of interacting
with the world despite her large geographical dimension,
(still) medium income level111 and problematic institu-
tional arrangement.
All in all, Russia may ﬁnd herself in a more favourable
environment for FDI than in the past. Given the volume and
quality of state assets announced for privatisation in mid-
2011 – and basically maintained, with some (possibly
temporary) exceptions, in 2012 – lack of interest on the part
of private investors is unlikely, though their actual partic-
ipation in auctions will depend on a number of circum-
stances, including proper procedures, the general business
environment and prospects for proﬁt. Unless acquisitions
entail broad opportunities for restructuring, labour layoff
and changing the proﬁle of the business, investors are likely
to be prudent. Concerning the Russian programme of106 Compared to Brazil (73rd) China (75th) and India (95t) see http://cpi.
transparency.org/cpi2011/.
107 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings.
108 The ranking is based primarily on a proprietary survey of more than
200 executives from 27 countries and 17 industry sectors. See the report in
http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/cautious-investors-
feed-a-tentative-recovery.html accessed on 30 May 2012.
109 See http://www.kommersant.ru/news/1927255 accessed on 1st May
2012.
110 See http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ accessed on 30 May 2012This
source also explains the methodology based primarily on international
ﬂows and interaction in each particular domain.
111 Two third of the population never went abroad, see http://www.
gazeta.ru/social/news/2012/04/05/n_2277797.shtml accessed on 5 April
2012.
S. Malle / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 78–9992privatisation outlined above, the government should pay
attention to ﬁxing reliable procedures and deadlines.
Uncertainties may matter more to investors than any
perception of the business climate of the country in the
past.
While new provisions that should reduce the number of
strategic sectors and open the room for foreign investment
also in banking have been submitted to the Duma on
February 2011,112 and the accession to WTO provide
favourable premises for a renewed surge in FDI after the
dismayed 2009–2011 performance, uncertainties on
companies, number of shares and strings attached in the
few cases of full divestment persist. Contrasting signals –
such as government’s announcements not backed by either
the Presidential Administration, the President himself or
the Central Bank as described in the previous section, as
well on-going consolidation in some sectors ofﬁcially (but
is that sure?) aimed at increasing the value of possible sales
in the future – may end up hampering the comparative
advantage that an emergent economy like Russia should
pursue in an international context where demand for FDI is
likely to overshoot supply.
Along similar lines, it is difﬁcult to gauge how signiﬁcant
are new provisions for the management of special
economic zones (SEZ) approved in the apparent aim of
giving more freedom in decision-making to the provinces.
By his October 5, 2009 decree, President Medvedev sup-
pressed the Federal agency for the establishment of special
economic zones devolving its functions to the Ministry of
Economic Development and assigning to regions a wider
scope for decision-making.113 While in principle decen-
tralisation should help identifying the most favourable
areas for development, in practice, the less endowed
territories may ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to ﬁnance the neces-
sary infrastructure. Perhaps other plans will be worked out
tomeet these challenges. There are 25 SEZ in Russia in 2012
from 13 in 2009 and 24 in 2011. 4 industrial production
zones and 4 technological and innovation zones; 14 tourist
and recreational zones and 3 port zones.
In 12 regions technological parks are being developed
where 670 resident companies are registered to become
operative over a large spectrum of products, from
nanotechnology to medicine and construction materials.
The expected volume of investment is about $12bn.
Companies from 24 countries are involved at one stage
or the other of the production plans. Large companies
such as Saint Gobain, Novartis and Nokia Siemens are
present.114 The technological parks are to be developed112 The Duma passed them in the ﬁrst reading in March 2011, See the
number 503176-5 in the website of the Duma, http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/
accessed on 24 May 2011. An overview of the amendments to the Law on
Strategic Investment can be found in http://www.pwc.ru/en/tax-
consulting-services/legislation/paket-popravok-Zakon-ob-inostrannyh-
investiciyah-strategicheskie-otrasli_.jhtml accessed on 25 May 2011.
113 See http://www.rg.ru/2009/10/06/medvedev-oez.html accessed on 6
October 2009.
114 See Putin’s report to the Duma on 20 April 2011, http://premier.gov.
ru/events/news/14898/ and http://www.economy.gov.ru/wps/wcm/
connect/6febcf00444c33568765e7af753c8a7e/sez_eng.pdf?
MOD¼AJPERES&CACHEID¼6febcf00444c33568765e7af753c8a7e pub-
lished on 21 March 2012.in Saint Petersburg, Moscow and Moscow Region and
Tomsk. The industrial zones are located in Lipetsk,
Tatarstan, Samara and Sverdvlosk. Interestingly, and
perhaps explaining Putin’s focus on the need for the
central government to speed up the development of
Siberia and the Far East, there are no special production
zones in these areas. The advantages of SEZ consist in
having access to a single window for administrative
procedures, special tax treatment (lower income tax, and
temporary tax exemptions on property, land, transport;
free customs regime (no import duty and refundable
VAT). Beneﬁts have increased under President Medvedev
in terms of tax reduction or duration of tax exemptions
and SEZ regime. The latter is now planned to last 49
years instead of 20. But transport infrastructure matters
a lot. It is not surprising that the SEZ for production or
technological purposes are situated in comparatively
more developed regions.
The concern that the government should do more to
attract FDI has been increasing together with the aware-
ness that it will be difﬁcult, at least in the short term, to
improve bureaucratic behaviour and reduce red tape in
the whole country. The establishment of special institu-
tions has, thus, been looked to as a means to overcome
such obstacles more quickly. In this context one should
appreciate Medvedev’s decision to dispatch ad hoc presi-
dential ombudsmen to the regions in order to assist
foreign investors getting through the bureaucratic hurdle
often encountered in dealing with elementary needs.115
There can be reasonable doubts that federal ofﬁcials
often unaware of local constraints will be fully up to the
task.116 But the intention that they should is to be
welcome.
Much alike the hesitant moves in privatisation, actual
and announced changes in FDI policy may not be
convincing enough to many foreign companies – especially
those with less experience in working with EMEs – to
seriously engage in the Russianmarket. While prospects for
proﬁts may look highly favourable depending on market
developments, economic performance in general ranks
low, with Russian productivity estimated to be 5 times
lower than that of advanced countries.117 Criminality is
widespread and often goes unpunished. A law increasing
penalties against reiderstvo – a criminal operation through
which companies are annihilated and their assets taken
over by fraudulent seizure – has been approved on July 5,
2010, in the hope of paving the way to the creation of
a more secure business environment.118The record until
now is far from reassuring, on the score of estimated 3
million raids over the past ten years concerning all sorts of
businesses and a number of quite a few instances still115 See http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/12173/print for a meeting
with ombudsmen on 2 August 2011.
116 See A. Yakovlev’s critical comments from regional experience with
ombudsmen in http://www.hse.ru/news/1163611/33557103.html on 4
August 2011.
117 See estimates in http://expert.ru/2011/04/1/rabotat-ne-hochetsya/
accessed on 1st April 2011.
118 See the text of the law and comments in http://www.rg.ru/2010/07/
05/zakon.html accessed on 5 July 2010.
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appeals against reiderstvo have increased ﬁve times and the
number of criminal sentences three times after changes in
the Criminal Code that were aimed at facilitating the ﬁght
against such practices by clarifying/broadening the nature
of reiderstvo compared to past provision, such as making
prosecution possible for ﬁling false tax ofﬁce data on the
founders, for forgery of the general meeting of share-
holders and board of directors, for falsiﬁcation of register
and the voting results.120 The struggle may take long time
and, while small-medium size companies are more likely to
be attacked, large companies are not totally safe either
when among the “raiders” there are high proﬁle public
ofﬁcials. While, statistically, the cases of reiderstvo exam-
ined by justice have increased and that likely points to
more transparency and conﬁdence in justice, the sheer
numbers of cases submitted to courts are worrying in
revealing the extent of economic abuse.
Nonetheless, by themselves corruption and abuse by
authorities or criminal gangs are not a decisive deterrent to
FDI.121 The increase in FDI in the early 2000s – when the
incidence of economic abuse started increasing – as
mentioned above suggests that the scope for foreign
investment remains large, though it needs to be further
supported by targeted reforms. It will depend on the
commitment of the government at all levels, both central
and local administrations, to make sure that law is not
violated and law infringements severely punished. The
institution of one window for all type of licencing and
a further nation-wide establishment of arbitrage courts that
had been introduced in the early 2000s could help. Reforms
of the highly corrupt police system pursued by Medvedev
need to continue and their results closely monitored. New
government appointments, such as General Vladimir
Kolokoltsev to head the Interior Ministry may also help
thanks to a good reputation as a professional with long
experience working within the Ministry’s structures.122The political context for M&D
The concluding section of this paper provides a view on
the interdependency between M&D goals, as conceived by
the leadership, and the organisation of social and political
consensus deemed necessary to implement structural
changes. Past and new government priorities and pro-
grammes to 2018 – the end of the current Presidential
mandate of Putin – need to be seen in the light of elections
results and possible challenges fromoppositionmovements.
The approach to modernisation from above as described
in this paper is hardly compatible with pluralism and time119 “Russian business Groups try to Address Asset Grabs”, Oxford Ana-
lytica 18 May 2012.
120 See http://www.izvestia.ru/news/521674 accessed on 12 April 2012.
121 See R. Connolly (2012), “Emerging Europe after the crisis: the chal-
lenge of structural transformation”, “ Russia e Europa dell’Est. Progetti e
prospettive di crescita”. Serie Studi Scientiﬁci- Rapporti di Ricerca, Polo
Scientiﬁco Didattico di Vicenza, Università di Verona, pp. 8–31, on lack of
meaningful statistical correlation between corruption and FDI.
122 See the proclamation of the new Minister at MVD by Putin in http://
news.kremlin.ru/news/15402/print accessed on 22 May 2012.consuming democratic debate. The emphasis on urgency in
the Russian approach to M&D calls for rapid decision-
making: in the Russian authorities’ view (and the country
past experience) this is better pursued by a corporatist state,
an organisation that allows for relatively fast and unchal-
lenged top-down decision-making. The model is not unique
to Russia, where it rests on the so-called vertical of power
structure. Democracy (under methods and procedures still
questioned not only by the authorities, but also by the pop-
ulation at large) is expected to develop later after the beneﬁts
of growth fromM&Dwillmaterialise and spread to society. A
corporatist approach to reform – with priorities set from
above and social consensus looked for through ad hoc privi-
leges for the elite and populist policies for the rest of society–
has been shared by both Medvedev and Putin in their
changing roles, albeit with some different emphasis on
priorities. This approach is consistent with an economy
where resources and monopolistic behaviour play a domi-
nant role for growth and competition is almost inexistent
making the economy more dependent on the government’s
mediatory role ineconomic and social interactions, and at the
same time more stable. The contours of the Russian corpo-
ratist state have been examined in a previous publication.123
Other deﬁnitions, such as managed democracy or authori-
tarian state, would not explain, in the view of the author, the
difference between the post-Soviet political developments in
Russia and those of developingor emergingmarket countries
that – though falling under the label of authoritarian states –
have not yet achieved the level of cultural, social and indi-
vidual development that is peculiar to Russia. The compara-
tively higher human and social capital of Russia means that
theneed for consensus is higher inRussia than inotherhoped
for “emerging democracies”, while – to a large extent as a by-
product of Russian history – social organisations – that
provide the seeds of pluralism in society – are not mature
enough to be able to produce a critical mass of reasonable
challenges to government policies.
While we can observe that still existing authoritarian
states show little hesitation in crushing any form of
opposition and/or are likely to resuscitate in a similar
format if opposition forces manage to take over one way or
the other, the Russian leadership in front of disorganised
opposition or criticism from a few liberal circles behaved in
a remarkably different way. It has been careful, ﬁrst, to ﬁnd
ways to broaden consensus well beyond that granted by its
representative party in the Duma – Edinaia Rossiia (ER) –
and, second–when grass root opposition emerged after the
elections – not to let numbers grow, by luring bright people
into its ranks through the establishment of ad hoc
bodies.124 It should also be noted that most of the “liberal”
opposition ﬁgures that emerged in the nineties managed to
ﬁnd – and keep, apparently unchallenged – for themselves123 See S. Malle, PSA pp.67–74.
124 This operation was probably successful exactly because many
people, albeit critical of the government, opposed more vehemently
street demonstrations. The rating of both Medvedev and Putin has been
raising along with opposition movements taking the streets, see VTsIOM’s
opinion poll in http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1956023 and the earlier
Levada Centre’s poll and graph in http://www.levada.ru/ both accessed on
June 9 2012.
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companies. Criticism occasionally raised against govern-
ment policies from these ﬁgures is, at best, implausible. A
meaningful opposition to Putin united under shared prin-
ciples and feasible alternative programmes has not
managed tomaterialise in Russia, while their numbers have
been gradually shrinking to irrelevance. The post-
Presidential election period due to the fading away of
unproductive opposition has rightly been called by Andrew
Monaghan125 “the end of the opposition era” contrary to
the focus on the approaching end of Putin’s era portrayed
by the media in Russia and abroad.
In this section the forms of co-optation devised by the
leadership are described and explained as skilful, though
not necessarily always effective, tools to gather the neces-
sary consensus for reforms in a society where the elite in
power, with all possible caveats, has shown to be much
more forward-looking than any opposition party repre-
sented in the Duma. It is true that the threshold for party
representation in Russia is higher, at 7% of those voting,
than in a many OECD countries, but it is also lower than the
10% threshold in Turkey often referred to as the only
Muslim democracy in the Middle East. As established by
Medvedev in 2011 the lower threshold – 5% – that was in
force in the nineties – and is common in many European
countries – will be restored and applied at the next elec-
tions. Whether this will help broadening the spectrum of
parties126 in the Duma is debatable. Even in the case of
success, one can fear that post-election coalition govern-
ments would hardly provide for better and stable alterna-
tives. Intriguing in Russia is the lack of efforts, or inability,
on the part of liberal opposition parties to ﬁnd common
grounds for a stronger, if not a major coalition party.127
Even Kudrin and Prokhorov have long shied away from
forming a new party.128 Billionaire Prokhorov – despite
being a new, youthful and ﬁnancially independent ﬁgure in
the political scene – after ﬁnally forming a new party in July
2012, did not really make efforts to attract on his own side
well-known ﬁgures from mainstream liberal opposition.129125 See A. Monaghan, The End of the Putin Era?, The Carnegie Papers,
Carnegie Europe, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Wash-
ington D.C, July 2012 pp.15–17.
126 There are to date 21 parties registered at the Ministry of Justice, see
http://news.mail.ru/politics/9267454/. The number of parties increased
after the approval in April 2012 of provisions lowering the necessary
number of signature to apply for party registration from 40,000 to 500.
127 Though moves in this direction may be taking place after the
disarray of street demonstrations.. See the proposal to join forces by
Kasyanov, Ryzhkov and Nemtsov and the possible formation of a Repub-
lican Party of National Freedom,http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/
1761953/parnas_i_rpr_obedinyatsya_v_respublikanskuyu_partiyu
accessed on 19 May 2012.
128 See on Kudrin’s hesitant moves in the regions http://www.izvestia.
ru/news/527039 and on Prokhorov’s questioning the usefulness of
parties compared with other means of attracting supporters and build
consensus in http://www.izvestia.ru/news/526921 both accessed on 9
June 2012.
129 See on Prokhorov S. Malle, PSA, pp.72 and 82–83. On post-election
2012t developments see http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/
1817530/prohorov_stavit_na_servis?from¼newsletter-editor-choice
accessed on 5 June 2012 and http://www.mk.ru/print/articles/703508-
politologi-mihail-prohorov-blizok-k-politicheskoy-smerti.html accessed
on 15 May 2012.Alexei Kudrin does not plan to transform his Committee for
Civil Initiative into a party either, while still playing some
role in threading with government ofﬁcials, including
primus inter pares, Putin that he continues to respect
although admitting political disagreements.130
The Russian statemay not encounter a serious challenge
to corporatism for quite a long time.131 An evolutionary
path – an option that people at large and experts critical of
the current establishment approve, should not prevent the
leadership from improving the quality of participation in
decision-making from outsiders.
Co-optation which is key to corporatism has been by
and large successful. It was adopted by the party Edinaia
Rossiia that remains the majority party with the ofﬁcially
recorded 49.3% of the voting in the 4 December 2011
elections.132 Namely, A. Shokhin, the head of the Russian
Industrialists Association, and often an outspoken critic of
government policies, is a member and a component of the
Presidium of the Party.
Co-opting on a larger scale was successfully pursued by
Putin through the creation of the All Russian National Front
in May 2011 under the slogans of love for the Fatherland,
improvement of people’s welfare, strengthening of the
might of the state and social justice.133 Medvedev tried
a similar approach after September 24 when together with
the candidature of Putin for President, the latter promised
that, if elected, his candidate for Premier would be
Medvedev.
It is unclear whether the ARNF will survive in its present
form as a grass root organisation of the (pro-Putin) willing,
skilfully used by Putin against Edinaia Rossiia when
needed, or it will be transformed into an either legal body
or state entity. The fact that the opinion polls’ rating of
Putin after the Duma elections remained much higher than
that of ER shows that his distancing from the party and
appealing to a broader network like the ARNF has been key
to gathering large support for the Presidential elections.134
The alternative, after the election, is apparently for the
ARNF members either to join ER – and possibly challenging
its organisation, commanding heights and vision from
within – or more likely after the appointment of Medvedev
as the leader of ER, in the view of the author, form its own
organisation to better exploit gained political power.135
According to Putin, indeed, the supra-party status of the
ANRF is a strength that should be maintained under any
alternative legal form.136 This suggests that will be up to130 See BBC Monitoring 25 May 2012 and http://www.akudrin.ru/news/
intervyu-ﬁnam-fm-18may.html.
131 See http://www.izvestia.ru/news/527011 (accessed on 9 June 2012)
reporting an opinion poll by VTsIOM on democracy and revolution. The
ﬁrst would be welcome by 3% of the population versus revolution by 1%.
132 http://ria.ru/ accessed on 5 December 2011.
133 http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/15108/print/ accessed on 7 May
2011.
134 See http://ria.ru/politics/20120120/544568435.html accessed on 20
January 2012.
135 On Shokhin’s view that Putin would not take the leadership of such
an organisation, see http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1946427 accessed
on 30 May 2012.
136 See http://www.rg.ru/printable/2012/04/04/putin.html accessed on
4 April 2012.
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government – not necessarily an easy task137– while Putin
will be freed from Party constraints and criticism that are
likely to increase under political pressure from both within
the Duma and outside.
As a weakened political ﬁgure and in need of larger
support for reforms, Medvedev, as awould-be Premier after
September 24 2011,moved to create an “OpenGovernment”
that people of good will were invited to join in the aim of
contributing to the working out of a reform agenda.138 On 8
February 2012 he signed a decree establishing “a working
group for the formation of Open Government” under the
direction of S. Ivanov, A. Dvorkovic and M.A. Abyzov with
the purpose, among other, of analysing the realisation/
effectiveness of the Presidential priorities at all levels and
forming groups of experts – including social organisations –
willing to advise on social and economic issues.139 The
process of formation of an open government by Medvedev
proceeded in parallel, and apparent coordination, with
Putin’s efforts to broaden his own base of supporters out of
his ASI initiative (discussed above) whose meeting in Skol-
kovo on 13 March was set to precede that organised by
Medvedev for 14 March. Both meetings basically discussed
the same issues: how to involve business and reform-
minded people – as an expression of an emerging middle
class – in the work of the government.140
As this process has developed, it has become apparent that
the key dilemma for the leadership is how to build broader
consensus to support their projects and priorities – some of
which are going to entail pains in terms of lay-offs and
bankruptcies if modernisation is, indeed, seriously pursued
under ﬁnancial constraints while simultaneously having no
much to offer in exchange to large sections of would-be
supporters. Efforts now concentrate on how to co-opt valu-
able skills throughmaterial or moral incentives, i.e. either the
prospect of appointment to government jobs or – since the
posts available are limited – the promise that their advicewill
matter in decision-making.141 This approach is not absolutely
new. At the beginning of his mandate in 2008, Medvedev
worked out a list of people – called reserve of cadres – to be
considered for future positions at the centre or in the regions.
It is unclear howuseful that listwas inpractice. In forming the
Open Government the issue of valuable human resources to
back government projects from within, or close to, the137 For an until now rare clash, at the Duma, between the representative
of the government on tax policy and two ER members, Makarov, the head
of the Budget Committee and Naryshin, the speaker of the Duma, on the
ground that tax policy should be discussed in the Parliament and not in
the corridors of the government, http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/
news/1792562/nashli_mesto_dlya_diskussij accessed on 29 May 2012.
138 See on Medvedev’s co-optation projects in http://www.izvestia.ru/
news/512593 20 January 2012.
139 See http://news.kremlin.ru/acts/14467/print accessed on 8 February
2012.
140 See http://mn.ru/politics/20120314/313460226-print.html on Putin’s
meeting in Skolkovo and. http://www.rg.ru/2012/03/14/medvedev-site.
html on Medvedev’s meeting the day after where the issue of choosing
the best public ofﬁcials on a competitive basis was raised, both accessed
on 14 March 2012.
141 See Medvedev’s promise that his experts’ council will not be deco-
rative but really inﬂuential on decision-making inhttp://government.ru/
docs/19012/ accessed on 22 May 2012.government re-emerged. But, while it is possible to assure
loyalty – that is an essential component of a corporatist
state142 – by offering in exchange top positions/status to the
comparatively less well-off,143 it is more problematic to win
on-goingsupport fromthebetter-off oracademics.The former
are in the position to compare government’s rewards with
private options, while academics may resent being distracted
from their regular job to serve the government. That this can
hardly be done for free was an issue candidly raised by the
Rector of the HSE at one of the meetings of the Open
Government chaired by Medvedev.144
Co-optation goes on also in extra government jobs
related, one way or the other, with government pro-
grammes or state property. By co-opting business people to
the government or government projects, such as the
billionaire Vekselberg to overview state-led innovation
developments in Skolkogo,145 or the new appointees to the
government many of which are rather wealthy according to
their income declarations, and by granting support to
powerful state managers such as Chemezov (Rostekhnolo-
gii), Chubais (Rosnano) and Miller (Gazprom) among many
others, Putin has managed to build a self-sustaining polit-
ical organisation whose backbone is provided by the
interpenetration of private business and party/state struc-
tures. Under his leadership the Russian corporatism has
strengthened and nationalism is becoming a set of values
broadly shared also among the opposition. It is remarkable
that in a recent opinion poll, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergei Lavrov and Deputy Prime Minister for Military
Matters Dmitri Rogozin have been rated higher than any
other politician.146 While this reﬂect a perhaps excessive
concern for security, the glue nationalism provides for
a country that come out of the sudden disintegration of the
Soviet Union and an abrupt collapse not only of output but
also of self-esteem could be beneﬁcial to growth without
necessarily turning into an aggressive mind-set – that
should be considered as the worst outcome – if the
conditions for growth and stability remain reasonably
under control.
The social conditions for the continuation of a corpo-
ratist order are there, but need to be sustained. A social
order that is not hostile to reforms but also suspicious of142 See in http://www.polit.ru/article/2012/05/21/tk200512/print/
(accessed on 21 May 2012) a revealing article by Tikhon Kraev, Loyalen,
nenalezhen. Doverennoe litso V.V. Putina.
143 See the unexpected appointment by Putin of Igor’ Kholmanskikh,
a rank and ﬁle worker of the wagon factory in Nizhny Tagil, Uralva-
gonzavod, the third manufacturer of military output in Russia, that,
before elections, openly challenged the street demonstrators against
Putin threatening to come to Moscow with all his fellow workers to
Presidential plenipotentiary for the Urals, http://www.kremlin.ru/news/
15368 and his biography in http://www.ria.ru/spravka/20120518/
652152509.html both accessed on 18 May 2012.
144 See Ya.I.Kuz’minov’s objection to the request the experts continue to
serve the government with no precise appointment, at the meeting of
Open Government with Medvedev http://government.ru/docs/19012/
accessed on 20 May 2012.
145 See http://www.xn–o1aabe.xn–p1ai/Default.aspx?CatalogId¼7971
accessed on 24 March 2010.
146 See http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1817527/nepopulyarnyh_
smenili_na_neizvestnyh?from¼newsletter-editor-choice for an opinion poll
carried out on 26–27 May 2012.
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large. With the entry into the WTO lobbying for protection
and subsidies from the government have increased, but it is
doubtful that the government will be in the position to
satisfy all demands.147 Costly social policies aimed to assure
for a certain time the support of the working class cannot
be sustained if growth and budget revenues subside under
the effects of a new international slow-down and/or the
need to revise the order of priorities, for instance, shifting
resources to the East. Occasional visits by the leadership to
large scale companies and benevolent meetings with their
workforce have frequently be used to gather support from
the regions. But if political reforms – that are under
discussion will return power to local governors, the latter
will need to respond to local demands and, in turn, strive to
win political support if necessary at the expense of federal
power.
While from what is described above the Russian
corporatist state appears as a rather solid construct, there
are ﬁssures and elements of erosion that under domestic
and foreign pressures may lead in time to another state
order, hopefully more liberal but possibly also more
authoritarian.148 See the list in http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/900 (2 April 2011)
and comments by Guriev (HSE) and Tsyvinski (Yale) in http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/print/article/the-purge-of-the-kremlin-chairmen/
434935.html accessed on J7 April 2011.
149 By 2010 Russia had lost 2.3 million people compared to 2002 census.
The most depopulated areas are in the East (see http://en.rian.ru/
infographics/20111222/170405728.html. Nonetheless there are some
improvements in recent years, to a large extent due to immigration, as
revealed by the 2010 census with total population of 142.9 million (about
a million more than 2009 estimates) and life expectancy up to 62.8 forSources of instability
This sectionwill brieﬂy discuss some ﬁssures that can be
already perceived in Russian corporatist construct, drawing
the attention to topics more immediately related to
economic as well as political change discussed in the paper
as well as to their interaction. One of the strong points in
the model of economic growth chosen by Russia was the
focus on (social) stability and (economic) growth. This
model, though, can hardly be sustained for long – in an
open economy – unless the outside word is also stable. In
synthesis, instability may arise out of conﬂicting aims and
elements of social disaggregation among which the
following deserve attention.
The very process of modernisation/innovation is one of
“creative destruction” necessarily entailing economic
and social costs.
The issue of lack of legitimacy has been raised for the
ﬁrst time with regard to the elections that have been
accused of fraud and manipulation.
The economy needs to adjust to pressures perceived
rightly or wrongly at the Eastern borders in the light of
the growing importance of China. The development of
Siberia and the Far East is necessary, but also costly and
potentially destabilising.
Either the programme of M&D will be pursued– as it
should at least to confront WTO’s challenges – or it will be
slowed-down/frozen waiting for better times if the loom-
ing new economic crisis worsens. In either case it will be
disruptive and costly.147 See an overview of widespread branch complaints and demands in
http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/1806994/kollektivnye_
strahi#ixzz1wWuYQ59K accessed on 1 June 2012.Russian corporatism rested for a long time on the
mutually supportive relations between businesses and state
and overwhelming state management of companies. It
occurred – and was quietly accepted – that top public ofﬁ-
cials also run such companies. Medvedev’s decree approved
in April 2011 forbidding state ofﬁcials from holding
company board’s position and chairmanship produced
a ﬁrst blow to such as corporatist arrangement. Ministers
and deputy-ministers nicely installed on the board of
a number of companieswere removed from17 state-owned
companies by July 1.148 While more still have to go and
formal substitution may not guarantee that independent
directors will take their place, the new provisions militate,
at least in principle, against corporatism.
Instability may also arise from restructuring entailed by
M&D government projects. For longer than a decade stability
has been assured thanks to growth induced by rising-oil
prices. Russia has remained a resource-based economy open
to the vagaries of international market. The re-orientation of
the economy towardsmore innovative products should entail
a shift in resources and changes in the relative prices of
production factors and output that could be highly destabil-
ising in an economy where mobility is low, therefore
comparativelymore expensive, andmore adaptable skills are
scarce. Change in relative prices will entail also changes in
relative well-being, with the less endowed Asian regions
suffering even more compared to the European regions.
Regionally perverse demographic trends149 will also hit the
worst off regions by attracting their more educated/skilled
labour to better paid jobs in theWestern regions. At the same
time industrial adjustment towards innovative products/
processeswill also entail lay-offs in less perspective branches/
companies located in the Western countries that – given the
skills needed for innovation – will not necessarily ﬁnd easily
redeployment to jobs in the same sector. The whole country
may suffer from labour shortage to a greater degree than
a free market economy where labour redeployment is made
easier by disperse decision making and schedules, with sub-
contracting to more agile and small production units taking
care of costly components and contracts such as factoring and
leasing spreading the costs and beneﬁts of restructuring over
a larger section of businesses and services. In addition,
changes to thepension age thatwouldhelppreserve access to
skilled labour in some areas are being postponed in Russia
adding another obstacle to diversiﬁcation compared to more
advanced market economies.men and 74.7 for women approaching the pre-transformation level of
1990, see E. Gavrilenkov, “Demograﬁcheskaya situatsiya v Rossii uluch-
shaetsya”, podderzhivaya ekonomiku, accessed on 12 March 2012
fromhttp://www.vedomosti.ru/ﬁnance/analytics/24772/
demograﬁcheskaya_situaciya_v_rossii_uluchshaetsya.
152 It is worth noting that Medvedev (see http://ria.ru/politics/
20120609/669619952.html accessed on 9 June 2012) is dissatisﬁed with
ER’s lack of proposals for the new round of regional elections scheduled
by end 2012, while ER is once again looking for outside support from
ARNF organisations and non-party members, see http://www.izvestia.ru/
news/527041 accessed on 9 June 2012. Apparently Medvedev is also
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economy will retrench to the former commodity/resource
structure that is also becoming increasingly costly because
of more difﬁcult access to sub-soil deposits or because of
increasing competition from either developing countries
with much lower labour costs or advanced economies
successfully adapting to price pressures by shifting R&D to
other energy sources or materials. These countries show
that innovation feeds itself. That is hardly the case of inno-
vationplanned and largelyﬁnanced fromabove as in Russia.
The issue of lack of legitimacy raised as such by Mikhail
Dmitriev has been preceded and followed by similar griev-
ances concerning the electoral process and thevalidity of the
results. While Dmitriev argued that the leadership had lost
its legitimacy basically because of inability to deliver on
promises, rightly or wrongly a number of people resented
the procedures and results of elections. Many became
convinced that elections to the Duma once again had not
been “clean” and that increasing “dirt” concerned essen-
tially, if not only, the majority party Edinaia Rossiia (ER),
despite this party being the main loser of votes. Compared
not only to past elections and to someparties that succeeded
entering the Duma, but, more humiliating, compared to
expectations of attaining a constitutionalmajority ER shrunk
to slightly below50%. Demand for transparency and revision
of electoral results continued until Presidential voting and
beyond. Prokhorov challenged in court the results of elec-
tions for Presidentwhere Putinwonwith 69.1% of the voting
with evidence of wrongdoing in some electoral sites.150 This
paper does not discuss the issue of elections per se. More
relevant to the purpose of this paper is that the structure of
power and its self-reproduction are being questioned. After
a while, the government, unless major mistakes are made,
may re-conquer the legitimacy necessary to rule simply
because there are no alternatives.
But mechanisms are now in place that are likely to
continuously challenge government’s “legitimate” deci-
sions from within and from outside. A few examples may
help to clarify this assessment. First, ER, as a rather “bat-
tered” winner of 2011 elections, needs to re-conquer its
own legitimacy in front of its lost electorate. A symptom of
how problematic that can be is that the party started
questioning its own soul: should the party be left-wing,
right-wing or somewhere in the middle of the political
spectrum?151 As a rule, any party before elections tries to
position itself on the margin in such a way as to gather
more consensus depending of the changing mood of
society while keeping its core vision. But soul searching by150 See http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1833034/prohorov_
sporit?from¼newsletter-editor-choice accessed on 8 June 2012.
151 On the need for ER to maintain a clear ideological position but at the
same time cover a broad political spectrum and renounce being the party
of power, see http://www.ng.ru/printed/267807 accessed on 13 April
2012. On three platforms (liberal, patriotic and social) advantageous for
ER see http://www.vz.ru/politics/2012/4/6/555124.print.html accessed on
6 April 2012 On ER going left or right see http://www.izvestia.ru/news/
520601#ixzz1qyauvz2f accessed on 2 April 2012. On Isaev pushing for
the left, see http://er.ru/news/2012/4/2/isaev-ideologiya-edinoj-rossii-
dolzhna-razvivatsya-v-levom-napravlenii/ accessed on 2 April 2012. On
the need for a party referendum to decide on what ER should be, see
http://www.izvestia.ru/news/520572 accessed on 2 April 2012.ER after elections and its uneasy relations with indepen-
dent deputies that managed to be elected in its lists thanks
to Putin’s instructions and the successive ARNF’s mobi-
lisation suggest that the party has lost cohesion and self-
conﬁdence152 and – with party member competing with
each other to win in their own constituencies – may
become a more uncomfortable cushion to the government
than it was in the past. In this context it will be interesting
to see how the leadership will try to enhance the role of
ARNF’s members. The alternative is either granting this
organisation a legal status, or some of his leading ﬁgures
prestigious posts.153 But, either way, passing government
policies at the Duma will be more difﬁcult and the search
for compromise may become time-consuming and dis-
tracting from the main concern that should be one of well-
conceived structural reforms.
Second, the “Open Government” (OG) may also become
an obstacle to reforms, despite good intentions, to the
extent that its very structure and duties are ﬂuid and the
participants do not know how important their advice will
be in actually drafting reforms. Advice by this body or by
selected advisors on special subjects is not mandatory by
law. The government, or the Premier, may or may not
indulge in this form of crowdsourcing. It is unclear what
would be the role of other organisations such as business
organisation on the one side, and trade unions, on the other
within the OG and whether they would indeed have any
role.154 While trying to legitimate the government’s
composition and policy in the eyes of society, these
developments may erode two main pillars of corporatism:
on-going support to government’s policy by business
associations and by trade unions.
While M&D programmes and restructuring under tight
WTO requirements will introduce per se elements of
instability that more spending in social policy may fend
only in part, in front of military priorities and unpredictable
oil-sustained budget revenues as described above, the
costly accelerated development of Siberia and the Far East –
that will take long time to deliver more balanced growth –
will add own disturbances into the Russian corporatisttrying to convince the youngest members of his government to adhere to
Edinaia Rossiia in order to create stronger linkages with the latter’s
apparatus, see http://www.izvestia.ru/news/527151 accessed on 12 June
2012.
153 Developments to date suggest that the ARNF is moving to demand
a legal status while also trying to conquer seats in the legislative bodies at
the regional level, eventually competing against ER, see http://www.
vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1843103/partii_putina?from¼newsletter-
editor-choice accessed on 15 June 2012 and http://www.izvestia.ru/news/
527272 accessed on 12 June 2012.
154 See critical comments by A. Shokhin on this structure from the point
of view of businesses and their associations. While under previous
arrangements, the association of industrialist run by Shokhin had
managed to work out together with the MED some provisions, this cozy
arrangement may be sacriﬁced to the need for “ social legitimation”, see
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1953290 accessed on 6 June 2012.
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Igor’ Shuvalov, the current First Deputy Premier estimates
that this programme to 2018–2029 may need 2 trillion
roubles. The charter capital of the existing Fund for the
Development of Far East the Baikal Region set up by the
state bank VEB amounts to only 500 million roubles to
date.155 As noted above, Putin reiterated more than once
that this programme is a priority. Indeed, in the light of the
growing worries for the proximity (in a broader than
geographical sense) of China, Russia is rapidly re-
orientating her main foreign policy and security concerns
towards the East. The combination of costly development
programmes and foreign policy concerns in the Eastern
part of the country represents a new development:
resources and production factors will need to be shifted to
the East whilst the rationale of the M&D plans developed
un the Presidency of Medvedev was Westward-orientated.
Either the shift of resources to the East will severely
impair Medvedev’s M&D subtracting, even more than in
the past, legitimacy to his government and to the entire
power structure, or a solution must be found by which
progress in the western part of the country will have to be
left to private undertakings and growing competitive
pressure – along a liberal reform path while accelerated
development controlled/forced from above will take place
in the East along a possibly tightened corporatist model
that will need to resort to a mix of incentive and command
to speed up progress. Between the either/or scenario – one
opening to democracy and reforms – a possibility
according to Chubais and a necessity according to Sho-
khin156 – the other turning towards authoritarianism,157
there could be a third option with regions forced to
operate under different systems of incentives and/or
constraints depending on their location. How can this
model be legitimised? By opening comparatively more to
the West commercially and socially also via a more relaxed
visa system, whist implementing protectionist policies in
the East, to the extent allowed by the WTO, via selected
non-tariff barriers and tightly controlled immigration
policies. The idea that accelerated development will also
need a special institutions and rules has already surfaced
in the press. The “Chinese threat” until now debated only
in narrow circles is likely to become a major topic of
discussion in the near term in the aim that nationalism
will help accept policies otherwise rejected by most. At the
same time, though less evident to the masses, the devel-
opment of the East, as hinted by Russian experts Bar-
abanov and Karaganov, could help improve the relations
between Russia and the US through joint ventures in the155 See on the appointment of Victor Ishaev former Governor of Kha-
barovsk’s region to Minister for the Development of the Far East, http://
www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1764374/dalnim_vostokom_zajmetsya_
ministr accessed on 21 May 2012. His biography in http://lenta.ru/lib/
14164555/ accessed on the same day.
156 See Shokhin in http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1953290 (cited) and
Chubais in BBC Monitoring from Ekho Moskvy Radio 1 June 2012).
157 Also a possibility under pro- authoritarian pressures from socio-
nationalist groups, see Aleksandr Nagorniy, “ Krivaia vertikal’. Krem-
lyovskaia vlast’ vyrastila sebe mogil’shchika” in http://zavtra.ru/content/
view/krivaya-vertikal/ accessed on 6 June 2012.exploitation of new energy sources.158 It is not unfore-
seeable either that common concerns for the excessively
rapid expansion of China help Russian and the US to ﬁnd
a better understanding on other issues related to defence
in the West.
Concluding remarks
In the aftermath of the 2009 ﬁnancial crisis Russia has
embarked on an ambitious programme of modernisation
and diversiﬁcation focused on new technology and
institutional reforms. While institutional reforms, many
of them carried out under Medvedev’s Presidency, would
provide for improving the business environment through
a horizontal industrial policy approach, the main focus
has remained on government plans for M&D monitored
from above. The blueprint for change – Strategy-2020 –
developed before the crisis has been revised to take into
account the effects of the crisis, tighter ﬁnancial and ﬁscal
constraints and the need for an evolutionary path to
change that cannot dismiss at once, in a few years, the
contribution of material resources and energy to GDP
growth. New scenarios for growth to 2030 are being
drafted with increasing focus on investment in the fuel
and energy sector. Among a number of speciﬁc reforms,
the innovation centre at Skolkovo and the Agency for
Strategic Initiative have received strong government
backing, though most funds are expected to be off-
budget.
Reforms have been carried out from a strong techno-
cratic viewpoint shared by and large by society and with
the support of large scale businesses. This is consistent with
the structure of Russian corporatist state that developed
under the two (2000–2008) ﬁrst mandates of Putin and
survived to date thanks to support from powerful rent-
seeking businesses circles and inﬂuential sections of the
working class linked to large scale companies and state
entities. While one cannot rule out speciﬁc projects of M&D
to succeed under government’s pressure and incentives,
the chosen path is patchy and costly. It is also unlikely to
help modernise the entire economy and become a self-
propelling engine for change, unless competitive pres-
sures are let to grow out of further integration into the
international economy through membership into theWTO,
that is expected to take place by the end of 2012 and the
OECD that is to follow. Entry into WTO is feared by many
and seen with suspicion by the would be losers in
competition.158 Oleg Barabanov, “Russian’s Far East. The Challenges of the Next
Decade” “Valdai Club”, 29 May 2012 in http://valdaiclub.com/asia/43500/
print_edition/ for an insightful comment on the need for Russia to
develop the Far East that would also help to improve relations with the
US. S, Karaganov develops on the subject stressing that any project
aiming at developing the Eastern part of Russia must look forward, taking
into account the challenges of Chinese rapid industrialisation, and try to
lure in investment from highly developed OECD countries, provide the
necessary transport and energy infrastructure, as well as preferential
treatment for investment, but refrain from approaching this issue as
a wall against other countries Eastwards or Westwards, see “Rossia
nuzhna esche odna stolitsa – Sibirskaya” in http://www.rg.ru/printable/
2012/05/16/stolica-site.html accessed on 17 May 2012.
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past, the government as a whole that supports entry into
WTO – despite the concomitant focus on regional free trade
area policies carried out from 2008 to date (from the
tripartite Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and
Kazakhstan to the Single Economic Space from the begin-
ning of 2012 to the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015) –
against opposition parties in the Duma and a number of
reservations stemming also from themajority party Edinaia
Rossiia. The new government under Premier Medvedev is
overall new blood and reform-minded. Conservative Putin
has kept in the Presidential Administration some of the
more experienced and tenacious former ministers. Rather
than hinting to parallel governments structures, the
present arrangements look much more cohesive and
determined to carry forward structural reforms.
The need for foreign investments and support in
research and development is ﬁnally openly acknowledged
by the leadership. Amendments to strict provisions on
investment in strategic sectors and legal changes to the
status and management of major state holdings point to
a certain relaxation of direct state control on production. In
addition, by contributing to tighter ﬁscal balances, the on-
going international crisis forces the authorities to accel-
erate the implementation of market-orientated reforms.
The volume of state assets slated for privatisation has
increased tremendously. There are plans to open some
large scale companies to private investors and in some
cases to divest state property completely. It appears thatthe government is determined to retain control of some
strategic companies for a while but will not hesitate to sell
large stakes if market conditions become favourable. While
more clarity on deadlines and number of assets for sale
would be welcome, the current plans clearly represent
a major step forward towards openness to FDI and
competition.
Pace and intensity of reformswill depend on constraints
– available resources and oil prices – and social consensus.
While until now extra-state structures, such as Putin’s
ARNF and the Medvedev’s Open Government helped to
build consensus and are still considered as important social
pillars for government policies, more ambitious goals and
change in priorities declined by Putin in assuming Presi-
dency may introduce ﬁssures in an apparently solid state
construct. Strong emphasis on the development of Siberia
and the Far East, compared to M&D projects by and large
conﬁned to the more advanced European regions, will
entail a redistribution of resources, capital and manpower,
and changes in relative prices within the country, at a time
when efforts should concentrate on improving the
competitiveness of sectors exposed to the European Union,
as the main trade partner of Russia. A conundrum that
perhaps could be solved by enforcing two different regimes
– a liberal one in the West and one under tighter state
administration and control in the East. All in all this might
not represent the worst evolutionary way out of Russia’s
form of corporatism that might, as it currently exists, have
become too tight for the whole society.
